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Comment
Knocking on the Courtroom Door: Finally an Answer
From Within for Employment Testers
Daniel M. Tardiff*

I. INTRODUCTION

The legacy of slavery and racial prejudice continues to affect
American culture,' and, over the years, it has served as the subject of
numerous studies and essays. 2 While discrimination appears in many3
forms and in many areas of American life, often very subtle in nature,
*

J.D. expected May 2002. 1 would like to dedicate this Comment to Sarah because your love

and your sense of faith truly make me a better person; I am lucky to share my life with you. To
my mom, Jane Tardiff, and my sister, Suzanne Tardiff, thank you for being a part of my
foundation, you will always be close to my heart. To George, Barbara and Matthew Lynch, thank
you for your love, guidance and presence in my life. I would also like to thank Dan Traver, Laura
Scotellaro and the editorial staff of this Journal for their editing advice and expertise.
1. John J. Donohue III, Historical Background, in FOUNDATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 3 (John J. Donohue III ed., 1997).
2. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail CarNegotiations, 104
HARV. L. REV. 817, 818 (1991) (studying the disparities among experiences between AfricanAmerican and white as well as male and female purchasers in retail car sales negotiations); Faye
Crosby, Stephanie Bromley & Leonard Saxe, Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White
Discrimination and Prejudice: A Literature Review, in FOUNDATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW, supra note 1, at 113-19 (discussing various studies conducted on attitudes
towards racism and prejudice in America); Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Devastating Impact of
the Justice System on the Status of African-American Males: An Overview Perspective, 23 CAP.
U. L. REV. 23, 52-55 (1994) (discussing the unemployment of African-American males and the
effects of employment discrimination on that segment of the population) [hereinafter
Weatherspoon, Devastating Impact].
3. Donohue, supra note 1, at 3; Stephen E. Haydon, Comment, A Measure of Our Progress:
Testing for Race Discrimination in Public Accommodations, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1207, 1214-16
(1997) (discussing the concept of testing vis-A-vis public accommodations and the significant
disparities in attitudes between whites and African-Americans regarding the extent of
discrimination in the United States). As Professor Charles Lawrence notes, "[w]e do not
recognize the ways in which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the
occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions. In other words, a large part of the behavior
that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation." Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987).
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an organized civil rights movement to eradicate discrimination in the
area of employment began to take shape around the time of World War
11. 4 Congress, however, did not pass specific legislation prohibiting
discrimination in employment until it implemented Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). 5 Today, Title VII prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, 6 but it has been, and continues to be, subject to Congressional
7
amendments and judicial interpretation.
After the passage of Title VII, employment discrimination litigation
proliferated quickly and, according to some commentators, continues to
impose a serious burden on federal judges. 8 Studies in the early 1990s
showed that employment discrimination litigation increased at a rate far
greater than the general civil caseload in federal courts. 9
As
employment discrimination litigation began to grow, civil rights
organizations adopted a method for ferreting out discrimination known
as "testing." 10 In the employment context, a tester is an individual who
is hired by a civil rights organization to approach employers while
posing as a job applicant.'" The tester, however, is not genuinely
interested in the position but collects information to determine whether
the particular employer is engaging in discriminatory conduct.12 If the
civil rights organization uncovers discrimination, the tester may file a
13
claim under Title VII against the employer.

4. 1 KENT SPRIGGS, REPRESENTING PLAINTIFFS INTITLE VII ACTIONS § 1.02[1], at 1-6 to 1-8
(2d ed. Supp. 2000) (describing the evolution of federal employment discrimination legislation).
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994, Supp. 1996, Supp. 1997,
Supp. 1998 & West Supp. 2000).
6. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2).
7. Most recently, Title VII was amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); see also I SPRIGGS, supra note 4, §1.02[6], at
1-12.1 to 1-13; infra Part II.A (discussing the historical framing of Title VII and the Civil Rights
Act of 1991).
8. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation,43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 983-84 (1991) (reporting on the dramatic rise
in employment discrimination lawsuits and analyzing trends associated with that increase).
9. Id. at 985. Donohue and Siegelman estimated that employment discrimination cases were
increasing at a rate of 344 cases per year. Id. at 987.
10. Steven G. Anderson, Comment, Tester Standing Under Title VII: A Rose by Any Other
Name, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1217, 1219-20 (1992); see also infra Part II.D (discussing the
purpose, methods and goals of testers in discrimination investigations).
11. Anderson, supra note 10, at 1219-20.
12. See id.; see also infra Part II.D.
13. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2) (1994); Anderson, supra note 10,
at 1221. Title VII makes it unlawful "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
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Critics argue that employment testing is deceiving and ethically
unfair to employers, and, among other things, that it unjustly increases
the costs of hiring. 14 As a result, lawsuits by testers have been
15
contested on the grounds that the tester-plaintiff lacks standing
because the tester is not genuinely interested in the job and, therefore,
fails to allege a sufficient injury. 16 Because the use of testing programs
is relatively new, the issue of tester standing has not been confronted
extensively by federal courts. 17 Nevertheless, initial responses to the
use of testers were not favorable. 18 In July 2000, however, the Seventh
Circuit issued a landmark ruling in Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Security
Services, Inc. ("Kyles 11'), 19 holding
that employment testers do have
20
standing to sue under Title VII.
national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In addition, it is unlawful "to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
§ 2000e(a)(2).
14. Shannon E. Brown, Comment, Tester Standing Under Title VII, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1117, 1140-41 (1992).
15. Standing is "[a] party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty
or right." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (7th ed. 1999); see also infra Part II.E (discussing
generally the problem of standing for testers and the constitutional and prudential requirements
for standing in all cases).
16. HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 13.10,
at 513-14 (1997).
17. The significant use of testing programs appeared during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
See infra Parts IIE-F (discussing the standing requirements at issue when testers bring Title VII
claims and how testers have been treated by lower federal courts), III.A-C (discussing the
treatment of employment testers by the Fourth, District of Columbia and Seventh Circuits).
18. Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268
(D.C. Cir. 1994) [hereinafter BMC II] (holding that employment testers lack standing to seek
monetary damages or equitable relief under Title VII); Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d
625 (4th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter Sledge 11] (noting that tester plaintiffs suffer no real injury
because they are not genuinely interested in the job); Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., No.
97 C 8311, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15428 (N.D. I11.Sept. 18, 1998) [hereinafter Kyles I] (holding
that employment testers lack standing under Title VII); Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., No. 1201,
1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14689 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 22, 1975) [hereinafter Sledge I] (dismissing the
Title VII claim of an apparent "test" plaintiff on the merits). Contra Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec.
Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that testers do have standing to sue under Title
VII) [hereinafter Kyles 11]; Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington v. BMC Mktg.
Corp., 829 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington
v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1272, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1994) [hereinafter BMC 11 (holding
that employment testers have standing under Title VII); see infra Parts II.F (discussing the
unfavorable treatment employment testers received in federal district courts), IlA-B (discussing
the Fourth Circuit's and District of Columbia Circuit's resistance to tester standing).
19. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2000).
20. This decision marked the first time a federal court explicitly held that testers have standing
to sue under Title VII. Id. at 300; Allan Gunn et al., Employment Testers Granted Right to Sue
Employer, 11 ILL. EMP. L. LETTER, Issue 1, Aug. 2000.
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This Comment will first chronicle the legislative history of Title VII
as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1991,21 both of which evoked
22 It will
important changes in employment discrimination litigation.
then explore the procedure for filing a claim under Title V11 23 as well as
the legal theories of recovery under Title VII.2 4 Part II of this Comment
will also examine the concept of employment testing in general 25 and
discuss the constitutional and prudential standing requirements that are
at issue in suits initiated by testers under Title VII. 26 Finally, Part II
will address the treatment of employment testers in the lower federal
courts.2 7 Part III of this Comment will then trace the progression of the
treatment of employment testers in the Fourth, District of Columbia and
Seventh Circuits. 28 Part IV will then critically analyze why the Seventh
Circuit's decision to grant standing to testers was appropriate and
briefly examine why the Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits
missed the mark on tester standing. 2 9 Finally, this Comment will
propose that the Seventh Circuit's decision should be followed in all
jurisdictions as a just method of enforcing Title VII, 30 and it will also
propose that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") be authorized by Congress to conduct its own testing
31
programs to further Title VII enforcement.
II. BACKGROUND

When it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress sought to
eradicate discrimination from the workplace. 32 Filing a lawsuit under
Title VII, however, requires that the plaintiff overcome several
procedural 33 and legal 34 hurdles. Employment testers 35 also face the

21. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
22. Infra Part II.A.
23. Infra Part I.B.
24. Infra Part II.C.
25. Infra Part llD.
26. Infra Part I.E.
27. Infra Part II.F.
28. Infra Parts HA-C.
29. Infra Parts 1V.A-C.
30. Infra Part V.A.
31. Infra Part V.B.
32. Infra Part II.A (discussing the historical, social and political processes and goals of Title
VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
33. Infra Part II.B (explaining the procedural requirements for filing a Title VII claim).
34. Infra Parts I.C, E (discussing the legal theories and standing requirements for filing a
Title VII claim).
35. Infra Part II.D (explaining the use and methods of "testing" in employment discrimination
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added obstacle of obtaining legal standing 36to sue, an endeavor that met
great resistance from several federal courts.
A. The Legislative History of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1991
During the years surrounding World War II, African-Americans and
women entered the workforce en masse for the first time due to the
increased need for laborers. 37 While the war itself created a labor
shortage, President Roosevelt facilitated the entry of women and
African-Americans by passing Executive Order 8802 and creating the
President's Committee on Fair Employment Practices ("FEPC") to
38
prohibit discrimination in the government and defense industries.
Throughout the next several years, dramatic gains were made in those
areas. 39 Following the war, however, Congress disbanded the FEPC
and racial and gender discrimination in employment increased once
again. 40
As the civil rights movement began to grow in the early 1950s, its
initial focus was the desegregation of public accommodations and the
institution of fair voting practices in the south. 4 1 By the early 1960s,
however, the quest for employment opportunities became an important
focus of the movement. 4 2 Due to increasing social and political
pressure to end various forms of discrimination, Congress promoted
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196443 as the "centerpiece of federal
efforts to end discrimination in the workplace." 44 Congress designed
Title VII to assure equality in employment opportunities and to remove

cases).
36. Infra Part II.F (discussing the differing results of the Fourth, District of Columbia and
Seventh Circuits on questions of whether employment testers have standing to file an
employment discrimination action).
37. I SPRIGGS, supra note 4, § 1.02[l, at 1-6 to 1-7.
38. 1 id. President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 on June 25, 1941. 1 id.
It outlawed discrimination in the government and defense industries on the basis of "race, creed,
color or national origin." I id. While racial equality drove the politics of the Executive Order,
Roosevelt added prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of creed (religion) and national
origin as well. I id. Roosevelt created the Committee on Fair Employment Practices to monitor
enforcement of the Executive Order. I id.
39. 1 id.
at 1-7.
40. 1 id.
41. lid.
42. l id.at 1-8. The importance of equality in the workplace is noted by the title given to a
1963 march in Washington, D.C., the "March on Washington for Freedom and Jobs." I id.
43. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994, Supp. 1996, Supp. 1997,
Supp. 1998 & West Supp. 2000).
44. I SPRIGGS, supra note 4, § 1.02[5], at 1-12 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 17).
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the discriminatory practices preventing equality. 45 Until 1972, the
scope of Title VII only applied to private actions and consequently
banned discrimination lawsuits against federal, state and municipal
government agencies. 46 Congress, however, passed an amendment in
197247 that expanded the coverage of Title VII to allow discrimination
lawsuits against federal, state and local governments. 48
Title VII prohibits public and private discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, 49 and the types of
employment practices outlawed are defined in very broad terms. 50 To
ensure enforcement, Congress created a private right of action for any
person claiming to be aggrieved, 5 ' thereby allowing individuals, as well
as the EEOC, to bring lawsuits. 52 Over time, the federal courts allowed
both disparate treatment 53 and disparate impact 54 claims in Title VII
suits, and Congress made it illegal for employers to retaliate against
individuals who opposed illegal practices and participated in the
enforcement process of Title VII. 55 Originally, a plaintiff successful on
the merits could only receive equitable relief from the court because

45. Anderson, supra note 10, at 1236 (discussing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
429-30 (1971)).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), (b); see Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
47. Equal Employment Opportunity Act § 2.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), (b); 1 SPRIGGS, supra note 4, § 1.02[5], at 1-12.1.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2).
50. 1 SPRIGGS, supra note 4, § 1.02[5], at 1-12.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). Title VII provides that:
If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this section is
dismissed by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing
of such charge .. . the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section .. . a
civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the
person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a member of the
Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged
unlawful employment practice.
Id.
52. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(l)(A); Anderson, supra note 10, at 1236 & n. 113, 1237-38 (discussing the
legislative history and comments of various legislators regarding the scope of Title VII).
53. Disparate treatment is "[tihe practice ... of intentionally dealing with persons differently
because of their race, sex, national origin, age or disability ...the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant acted with discriminatory intent or motive." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 381 (7th ed.
1999); see also infra Part II.C (differentiating between recovery in disparate treatment and
disparate impact cases).
54. Disparate impact is "[t]he adverse effect of a facially neutral practice ... that nonetheless
discriminates against persons because of their race, sex, national origin, age or disability and that
is not justified by business necessity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 381 (7th ed. 1999); see also
infra Part II.C (describing the history and elements of disparate impact cases).
55. 1 SPRIGGS, supra note 4, § 1.02[5], at 1-12 to 1-12.1.
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Title VII prohibited recovery of monetary damages. 56 While courts
held that back pay was a form of equitable relief for plaintiffs unjustly
terminated, Title VII provided injunctive or declaratory relief for
57
plaintiffs subjected to discriminatory hiring practices.
In June 1989, the Supreme Court of the United States dramatically
cut back several anti-discrimination protections through a number of
key decisions. 58 In response to the "June 1989 Massacre," Congress
passed a broad package that sought to restore Title VII to its previous
power. 59 President George H. Bush vetoed this package, 6° however, on
October 22, 1990.61 Despite the Presidential veto, Congress again
passed the same package of reforms in 1991.62
Though a veto on this version of the bill appeared certain, legislators
garnered enough support for the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("Act") to
override another Presidential veto and essentially forced President Bush
to acquiesce. 63 The President signed the Act into law on November 21,

56. 1 id. at 1-12.1.
57. 1 id.
58. Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989) (holding that the provisions of a
bona fide employee benefit plan are exempt from the Age Discrimination in Employment Act if
they are not used to discriminate in other non-fringe-benefit aspects); Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding, inter alia, that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not apply to racial
harassment relating to conditions of employment after the contract has been formed); Lorance v.
AT&T Techs., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (holding that the statute of limitations begins at the adoption
of a seniority system and that proof of intentional discrimination is an essential element when
challenging seniority systems under Title VII); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (reversing
trial court's dismissal of white firefighters' reverse discrimination claims on res judicata
grounds); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (holding that plaintiffs failed
to make a prima facie case of disparate impact by showing a racial imbalance in one segment of
the employer's workforce); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that an
employer who had allowed a discriminatory impulse to play a motivating part in an employment
decision could avoid liability by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
made the same decision in the absence of discrimination); see also 1 SPRIGGS, supra note 4, §
1.02[6], at 1-12.1.
59. 1 SPRIGGS, supra note 4, §1.02[6], at 1-12.1 to 1-13.
60. Civil Rights Act of 1990, S. 2104, 101st Cong. (1990).
61. 1 SPRIGGS, supra note 4, §1.02[6], at 1-13.
62. 1 id. The Congressional passage of the 1991 Act required no hearings and no reports but
only limited debate on the final provisions of the Act. DAVID A. CATHCART ET AL., THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACTOF 1991, § 1.02, at 7 (1993).
63. 1 SPRIGGS, supra note 4, §1.02[6], at 1-13. The President was forced to acquiesce
because Congress obtained a two-thirds majority to override the Presidential veto. I id.
According to the Constitution:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall,
before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he
approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House
in which it shall have originated, who shall ... proceed to reconsider it. If after such
Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent,
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1991,64 thereby restoring Title VII to the stature it held prior to the
Supreme Court's "June 1989 Massacre." 65 For the first time, plaintiffs
could recover compensatory and punitive damages for claims of
intentional discrimination under Title VII and the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 66
B. Procedurefor Filing a Title VII Claim
67
Two main procedures enforce the rights guaranteed by Title VII.
The first procedure involves individual charge-initiated actions. 68 The
second procedure allows the EEOC to initiate suits when it believes
there is a systematic pattern or practice of discrimination by a particular
employer. 69 Though EEOC initiated suits are authorized, most Title VII
suits are privately initiated.7 ° In private suits, there are two main
conditions that must be satisfied.7 ' First, a charge must be filed with the

together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law ....
If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sunday excepted)
after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if
he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which
Case it shall not be a Law.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.
2.
64. 1 SPRIGGS, supra note 4, § 1.02[6], at 1-13 n.30.
65. 1 id.at 1-13.
66. CATHCART, supra note 62, §§ 1.01, 1.03, at 2, 9. In addition to recovering monetary
damages, the 1991 Act also gave plaintiffs the right to a jury trial. Id. at 2. Damages were only
recoverable, however, in cases of intentional discrimination, not in disparate impact cases, which
focus on the discriminatory results of facially neutral practices. Id. at 9. Furthermore, damages
were only recoverable if the plaintiff could not recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the
Act set caps on the damages anywhere between $50,000 to $300,000 depending upon the
employer's size. Id. at 5, 9. Allowing plaintiffs to recover damages and seek jury trials marked a
fundamental change in the nature of employment discrimination legislation. Id. at 9. Prior to the
1991 amendment, damages were not recoverable under Title VII, and the focus was on
conciliation and improving employer-employee relationships. Id. For a discussion of the
recovery of compensatory and punitive damages in cases involving testers, see Michael J.
Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover and Remedy Discriminationin
Hiringfor Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 442-45 (1993).
67. 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 11.1, at 424 (2d ed.
1988).
68. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994); 1 SULLIVAN, supra note 67, at
424. An individual charge-initiated action is one in which the plaintiff is an individual bringing
the lawsuit against the employer, as opposed to suits initiated by the EEOC. 1 SULLIVAN, supra
note 67, at 424-25.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a), (c); I SULLIVAN, supra note 67, at 426.
70. LEWIS, supra note 16, at 278.
71. 1 SULLIVAN, supra note 67, at 427.
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appropriate administrative agency. 72 Second, a civil suit must be timely
filed by either the EEOC or the individual.7 3
Before filing a lawsuit, an individual claiming to be aggrieved by a
discriminatory practice, or someone acting on behalf of an aggrieved
person, 74 must first file a formal charge with the EEOC or a similar state
agency. 75 Agreements between the EEOC and state or local agencies
help to ensure that aggrieved persons are better able to bring lawsuits
against discriminating employers by allowing charges filed with one
agency to constitute filing with another agency. 76 These agreements
also allow aggrieved individuals
to file with the EEOC prior to filing
77
entity.
state
or
local
the
with
Whenever a charge is filed with the EEOC, if the EEOC subsequently
files a charge against an alleged discriminating employer, it must give
the employer notice of the charge within ten days of the individual's
charge, and it must then determine whether reasonable cause exists for
the charge. 7 8 If the EEOC finds reasonable grounds for the charge, it
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); I SULLIVAN, supra note 67, at 427.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); I SULLIVAN, supra note 67, at 425, 427.
74. Specifically, Title VII provides that charges may be "filed by or on behalf of a person
claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); I
SULLIVAN, supra note 67, at 424-25. Those who may file on behalf of an aggrieved person are
members of the EEOC. I SULLIVAN, supra note 67, at 425.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c); LEWIS, supra note 16, at 278-79. If state or local law prohibits
the particular practice and gives power to an administrative agency to grant or seek relief, the
aggrieved individual must follow state or local procedure first. LEWIS, supra note 16, at 278-79
(referring to the statutory guidelines of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)). If a state or locality does not
have procedures for handling charges of employment discrimination, the individual need only
conform with EEOC requirements. Id.
If required to file a charge with a state or local agency, a complainant must file that charge
within 240 days of the incident. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c); LEWIS, supra note 16, at 279. Upon
filing a charge with the state agency, the complainant has a few options for filing with the EEOC,
beyond any agreements between the federal and state agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c); LEWIS,
supra note 16, at 279. First, the complainant can file a charge with the EEOC sixty days after
filing a charge with the local or state entity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c); LEWIS, supra note 16, at
279-80. In addition, the complainant can file a charge with the EEOC within thirty days of
receiving notice that the state or local agency plans to terminate its proceedings, or within 300
days of the incident, whichever happens earlier. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l); LEWIS, supra note
16, at 279-80.
In jurisdictions where there is no authorized state or local agency, the complainant must file a
charge directly with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e); LEWIS, supra note 16, at 279. When filing with the EEOC, the date of the unlawful
employment practice is generally considered as the date on which the complainant learns or
should have learned that the practice was unlawful, not necessarily when the consequences of that
practice become manifest. LEWIS, supra note 16, at 280.
76. LEWIS, supra note 16, at 279.
77. Id.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), 5(e)(1).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 32

must seek alternative methods of resolution prior to filing a civil suit. 79
If the EEOC does not find reasonable grounds, the complainant has
ninety days to file a private civil suit.80 Finally, if the EEOC does not
file suit within 180 days after the complainant filed a charge with the
EEOC, the complainant may request a right to sue letter from the EEOC
civil action within ninety days of receiving the right
and file a private,
81
to sue letter.
C. The Legal Theories of a Title VII Claim
Regardless of who initiates the Title VII lawsuit, most Title VII
discrimination claims fall into two main categories: disparate treatment
or disparate impact. 82 Disparate treatment claims involve situations in
which the plaintiff received different treatment because of membership
in a protected class. 83 Unlike disparate treatment cases, disparate or
adverse impact cases focus on whether facially neutral employment
practices adversely impact a protected class member. 84 Put another

79. Specifically, "[if the Commission determines after [its] investigation that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate
any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation,
and persuasion." Id. § 2000e-5(b); I SULLIVAN, supra note 67, at 425.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 1 SULLIVAN, supra note 67, at 425.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); I SULLIVAN, supra note 67, at 425. A right to sue letter
testifies that the complainant followed all of the relevant procedural requirements prior to filing a
lawsuit in court. See I SULLIVAN, supra note 67, at 472-74. Because each complainant has an
unqualified right to the letter from the.EEOC, receipt of the letter is essentially a formality. Id.
While courts generally consider the letter an important formality, suits are permitted prior to
receipt of the letter when the EEOC unjustifiably fails to issue one in a timely manner. Solomon
v. Hardison, 746 F.2d 699, 702 (11 th Cir. 1984) (reversing the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's case for failure to obtain a right to sue letter when the plaintiff made a diligent attempt
to obtain the letter prior to filing suit but the Attorney General refused to issue the letter); I
SULLIVAN, supra note 67, at 474.
82. Anderson, supra note 10, at 1225.
83. Id.
84. 1 BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 81,
81 (Paul W. Crane, Jr. ed., 3d ed. 1996); Anderson, supra note 10, at 1225-26. While disparate
treatment cases are often initiated by individuals that "challenge discrete acts of intentional
discrimination," disparate impact cases are often class actions that "challenge facially neutral
employment practices." 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra, at 82.
Perhaps the most important disparate impact case occurred in 1971 with Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Several African-American employees of
Duke Power Company in North Carolina brought claims under Title VII challenging the
company's high school diploma and general intelligence test requirements. Id. at 425-26. Prior
to the adoption of Title VII, the defendant employer openly discriminated against AfricanAmericans by placing them in jobs within the lowest paying department of the company. Id. at
426-27. At that time, the Labor Department was the only department that did not require a high
school diploma. Id. at 427. On the eve of Title VII's adoption when the company could no
longer limit African-Americans to only the Labor Department, however, the defendant expanded
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way, disparate treatment covers discriminatory intent, while disparate
impact deals with discriminatory results. 85 Generally, lawsuits by
testers fall into the disparate treatment category because the testers
present an employer with a choice between two equally qualified
87 If
applicants 86 where one is a member of a protected minority group.
the employer consistently chooses the applicant not belonging to a
protected class over the equally qualified protected class member, such
decisions are deemed intentional and labeled disparate treatment
88
discrimination.
1. Recovery in Disparate Treatment Cases
Disparate treatment cases may be proven by direct or circumstantial
evidence. 89 Direct evidence, such as a memorandum stating that a
particular plaintiff was not hired because he was a member of a class
the diploma requirement to every department. Id. In addition, the company also required
employees to achieve satisfactory scores on two general intelligence tests. Id. at 427-28.
The plaintiffs challenged these requirements, both facially neutral as all employees were
required to meet them, on the grounds that the requirements had a disparate impact upon AfricanAmericans. Id. at 425-26. In striking down both requirements, the Supreme Court found that
neither test was related to job performance. Id. at 431. Under a disparate impact analysis, the
challenged practice must be job related and utilized out of business necessity. Id. The Court
recognized the disparate impact of these requirements because African-Americans "have long
received inferior education in segregated schools." Id. at 430. Furthermore, disparate impact
analysis is justified under Title VII because "Congress directed the thrust of [Title VII] to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." Id. at 432.
In Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Court again addressed the business necessity issue. Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). The plaintiff in Dothard challenged the height and weight
requirements for the position of correctional counselor in the Alabama state correctional system.
Id. at 323-24. The state required applicants to weigh at least 120 pounds, and stand five feet, two
inches tall. Id. According to the plaintiff, such requirements had a disparate impact on women
and were, therefore, discriminatory in violation of Title VII. Id. at 323, 328-29. Noting that its
decision in Griggs served as a guide for disparate impact cases, the Court undertook a statistical
analysis of the impact of the requirements on male and female job applicants. Id. at 330. In order
to justify its policies, the defendant argued that the height and weight requirements had a direct
relationship to strength, which is required for the position of correctional counselor. Id. at 331.
Yet, the defendant failed to introduce any evidence in the district court that the requirements had
any relationship to strength. Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court stated that "[i]f the job-related
quality that the appellants identify is bona fide, their purpose could be achieved by adopting and
validating a test for applicants that measures strength directly." Id. at 332. Without a showing
that a relationship existed between the requirements and the need for strength in the applicant, the
Court held that the requirements were a violation of Title VII. Id. at 332; see also infra Part
II.C.2 (surveying the history of recovery in disparate impact cases).
85. 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 84, at 81.
86. See infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text (discussing the role of employment testing
in ferreting out discriminatory hiring practices).
87. Anderson, supra note 10, at 1226 n.50.
88. Id.
89. 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 84, at 10- 11.
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protected under Title VII, directly proves the defendant's discriminatory
intent. 90 Circumstantial evidence, however, requires the fact finder to
infer discrimination from the facts at hand but does not offer direct
proof of the defendant's discriminatory intent. 9 1 Many cases of
discrimination rely upon circumstantial evidence because plaintiffs
92
often cannot produce direct evidence of discrimination.
A trio of United States Supreme Court cases laid out the framework
for proving discrimination claims with circumstantial evidence:
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,93 Texas Departmentof Community
Affairs v. Burdine,94 and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.95 Under
this framework, the plaintiff must first prove her prima facie case
90. 1 id. at 11.
91. 1 id. Circumstantial evidence is "[e]vidence based on inference and not on personal
knowledge or observation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 457 (7th ed. 1999). For example, if the
plaintiff offers evidence that the defendant never hires women, despite the fact that several
qualified women have applied over the years, the fact finder may infer that such evidence
indicates a discriminatory motive on the part of the employer. 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN,
supra note 84, at 11.
92. 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 84, at 11.
93. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, the
plaintiff was an African-American male laid off from his position with the defendant employer.
Id. at 794. After being fired, the plaintiff and other civil rights activists staged a "stall-in" to
block the roads leading into the defendant's St. Louis plant. Id. at 794-95. When McDonnell
Douglas later advertised for job openings, the plaintiff reapplied for a position. Id. at 796. The
defendant rejected the plaintiff's application, basing its decision in part on the plaintiff's
participation in the stall-in. Id. In considering the plaintiff's disparate treatment claim, the
Supreme Court, for the first time, clearly articulated the plaintiffs burden in establishing a prima
facie case. Id. at 802. Because the plaintiff established a prima facie case, and the defendant's
reason for not rehiring the plaintiff was legitimate, the Court remanded the case to give the
plaintiff an opportunity to show that the defendant's reason was pretextual. Id. at 807.
94. Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). In Burdine, a female
plaintiff filed suit against her former employer alleging that the failure to promote her to a
supervisory position that remained open for about six months and her subsequent termination was
predicated on gender discrimination. Id. at 251. The Supreme Court considered the case in order
to reexamine the burden on the defendant to rebut the plaintiffs prima facie case in light of the
Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 252.
95. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). The plaintiff in Hicks was an
African-American male who worked as a correctional officer in the Missouri Department of
Corrections and Human Resources ("MDCHR"). Id. at 504-05. After the MDCHR underwent an
investigation and supervisory changes, the plaintiff experienced problems with his new boss. Id.
Eventually, the defendant demoted the plaintiff from his shift commander position and terminated
him shortly thereafter. Id. at 505. In considering the relationship among the shifting burdens of
proof in a disparate treatment case, the Court held that the plaintiff first established his prima
facie case and that the defendant adequately rebutted the presumption created by the prima facie
case. Id. at 506-07. The real import of the Hicks decision, however, is the Supreme Court's
holding that a court is not compelled to find for the plaintiff merely because he rebuts a
defendant's legitimate reason for the practice. Id. at 511. Put simply, the plaintiff may need to
provide additional evidence of discrimination in order to convince the trier of fact to find in his
favor. Id. Thus, the court may find for the plaintiff, but is not compelled to do so. Id.
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according to the standard laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.96 To do so, the plaintiff must show that 1) the plaintiff belongs
to a protected group, 2) the plaintiff was qualified and applied for the
job for which the defendant was seeking applications, 3) though
qualified, the plaintiff was rejected, and 4) the defendant continued to
solicit applications from individuals as qualified as the rejected
plaintiff.97 Though the plaintiffs prima facie case consists of these four
elements, the Supreme Court recognized that each case will present
different circumstances, and, thus, the elements of a prima facie case
must be adaptable to the case at hand.9 8
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed that upon proving a prima facie case under the
McDonnell Douglas standards, the plaintiff creates a presumption that
the defendant employer acted in a discriminatory manner and made the
hiring decision based upon impermissible factors. 99 This presumption is
created because the plaintiff's prima facie case eliminates the most
likely legitimate reasons for rejection-lack of qualifications and lack
of a job opening. 100
Once this presumption is created, the burden then shifts to the
defendant to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to rebut the
inference of discrimination. 0 1 However, the burden on the defendant is
10 2
light, as the plaintiff always bears the ultimate burden of persuasion.

96. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; I LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 84, at 13.
97. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 84, at 1415.
98. The Supreme Court noted in McDonnell Douglas that the factual scenario presented by
every case will not be the same. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13. Thus, the elements
of the prima facie case are slightly adaptable to the circumstances presented in any particular
case. Id.; Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). For example, a plaintiff
alleging that an employer's seniority system is discriminatory generally does not need to prove
that she applied for the promotion if the employer routinely offers promotions to persons with her
seniority and position. LEWIS, supra note 16, at 227 (citing Loyd v. Phillips Bros., Inc., 25 F.3d
518 (7th Cir. 1994)). Likewise, the first element of showing membership in a protected class is
"pro forma." Id. Even a white male can establish himself as a member of a protected class on
religious, racial, or national origin grounds compared to the class he alleges is preferred. Id.; see
also I LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 84, at 15.
99. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55; 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 84, at 16.
100. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-56; LEWIS, supra note 16, at 227; 1 LINDEMANN &
GROSSMAN, supra note 84, at 16.
101. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55; LEWIS, supra note 16, at 228-29; 1 LINDEMANN &
GROSSMAN, supra note 84, at 17.
102. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993); 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN,
supra note 84, at 17. The Supreme Court noted that:
[T]he Court of Appeals' holding that rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons
compels judgment for the plaintiff disregards the fundamental principle of Rule 301
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Furthermore, the defendant does not even need to prove that it was
motivated by its proffered reason. 10 3 Rather, the defendant need only
raise "a genuine issue of fact as to whether [the employer] discriminated
against the plaintiff."' '
Some commentators believe that courts have
considered nearly any reason offered by the defendant as legitimate, so
long as the defendant does not rely on the plaintiff's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. 10 5 Such decisions show deference to
the employer's knowledge of its own productivity, safety and efficiency
requirements. 106
If the employer creates a fact issue by providing evidence of a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant's justification was a pretext for
discrimination. 10 7 Prior to St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,'018 a
plaintiff could prove that the defendant's explanation as to why the
plaintiff was not hired was pretextual by showing through affirmative,
direct evidence that the employer relied on the plaintiffs protected class
status.' 9 The plaintiff could also prevail by persuading the trier of fact
with indirect evidence that the defendant's explanation was
implausible."l 0 The Hicks Court held, however, that a finding for the
plaintiff is not mandated if a plaintiff is able to show through
circumstantial evidence that the defendant's explanation for not hiring
the plaintiff was pretextual.111 While the Court rejected a "pretext-plus"
rule, which would require the plaintiff to disprove the defendant's
explanation as well as provide direct evidence of discrimination, the
Hicks decision has left the lower courts uncertain. 112 Ultimately, if the
plaintiff can convince the fact finder that the defendant's reason for
rejecting the plaintiff was a pretext for discrimination, the plaintiff will
that a presumption does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores our repeated
admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the "ultimate burden of
persuasion."
Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (emphasis in original).
103. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
104. Id.
105. LEWIS, supra note 16, at 229.
106. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978) (discussing how courts are
incompetent to restructure business practices and should not do so without a mandate from the
legislature); LEWIS, supra note 16, at 229.
107. 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 84, at 22 (relying on Tex. Dep't of Cmty.
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981)).
108. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
109. LEWIS, supra note 16, at 231.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at231-32.
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succeed. 1 3 Exactly what standards determine whether a plaintiff is
successful are still debated in many ways. 114
2. Recovery in Disparate Impact Cases
While disparate treatment cases focus on the discriminatory intent of
employers, disparate impact cases focus on the results of facially neutral
employment practices on members of a protected class." 5 In 1971, the
Supreme Court decided the seminal disparate impact case, Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. 116 The Griggs Court held that Title VII proscribes
overt discrimination as well as practices that discriminate in their
operation. 117 The Court later clarified the procedure for disparate
impact claims by stating that the plaintiff must first make a prima facie
case by showing that the defendant's practice or policy selects
applicants in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool
118
of applicants.
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant must
demonstrate that the practices or policies are "job-related" and
consistent with "business necessity."" 9 The Civil Rights Act of 1991's
amendment to this step generated controversy because it imposed a
burden of proof, in addition to the burden of production, upon the
120
defendant to prove that the decision was out of business necessity.
113. Id.at236-37.
114. Id. at 237.
115. 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 84, at 82; see supra notes 83-84 and
accompanying text (describing the differences between disparate impact and disparate treatment
cases).
116. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra
note 84, at 83; see also supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing the factual and
procedural background of Griggs).
117. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 ("[Title VII] proscribes not only overt discrimination but also
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business
necessity. If the employment practice ... cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the
practice is prohibited."); I LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 84, at 84.
118. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN,
supra note 84, at 84-85 (clarifying the allocation of the burden of proof for job-relatedness of
validation tests in Title VII cases).
119. 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 84, at 85; see Griggs,401 U.S. at 431.
120. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A) (1994); CATHCART, supra note
62, at 20. In many ways, the 1991 Act was a response to the Supreme Court's decision in Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), which established a very broad, employerfriendly definition of "business necessity." CATHCART, supra note 62, at 25. The 1991 Act's
amendments to Title VII, however, do not specifically define the term "business necessity." Id. at
26-27. Instead, the 1991 Act indicates that an Interpretive Memorandum should serve as the
exclusive legislative history on the meaning of "business necessity." Id. at 27 (citing 137 CONG.
REC. S15276 (Oct. 25, 1991)). Section 3 of the 1991 Act and that Memorandum merely say that
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However, if the defendant is able to offer sufficient justification for the
challenged practice, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that
there were "less discriminatory alternatives" available to the
defendant. 12 1 This final step gives the plaintiff the opportunity to show
that the defendant refused to implement an effective alternative practice
or policy that would22 have less of an adverse impact on the members of
the protected class. 1
D. Employment Discrimination"Testing"
Employment testing is a means by which civil rights organizations
uncover discriminatory hiring practices in violation of Title VII. 123 An
employment tester does not have a genuine interest in accepting an
employment offer but gathers evidence of discriminatory hiring
practices by posing as an applicant. 124 Testers have long been used in
the housing sector to determine if landlords or sellers of real estate were
125
engaged in discriminatory conduct.

the terms "business necessity" and "job related" refer to the meaning given those terms by the
Griggs Court and in other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove. Id. Because the 1991
Act's definition of the terms is vague, and the Supreme Court's post-Griggs, pre-Wards Cove
decisions do not reflect a uniform interpretation of the terms, "business necessity" and "job
related" could still be defined by a conservative federal bench along Wards Cove lines. LEWIS,
supra note 16, at 270.
121. LEWIS, supra note 16, at 266; 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 84, at 87; see
also supra notes 94, 101 and accompanying text (discussing the burden on the defendant to show
a nondiscriminatory reason to rebut the plaintiff's case-in-chief). An example of a sufficient
justification by the employer is noted by the Supreme Court in Hicks. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993). The Court held that the employer met its burden of production
by offering the severity and accumulation of the plaintiff's rules violations as its
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his employment. Id. at 507-08.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(ii), (k)(l)(C); 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 84,
at 87. However, there are two areas of disagreement among parties. 1 LINDEMANN &
GROSSMAN, supra note 84, at 87. The first is over how effective the alternative(s) must be or
from whose perspective it must be effective. 1 id. The second centers on the employer's
knowledge as to the existence of a less restrictive alternative. 1 id. Employers argue that the test
can only be met if the employer had actual knowledge of the alternative, while plaintiffs argue
that the employer is liable if they knew or should have known about the alternative.
123. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 1219-20. The Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago
and the Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington are two organizations that hired testers
and initiated lawsuits with testers as plaintiffs in recent years. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d 289, 291 (7th
Cir. 2000); BMC I1, 28 F.3d 1268, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
124. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at 291; Standing of Testers to File Charges of Employment
Discrimination, I EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) No. N-915-062 (Nov. 20, 1990), superseded by
Enforcement Guidance of Whether Testers Can File Charges and Litigate Claims of Employment
Discrimination, 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 915.002 (May 22, 1996) [hereinafter EEOC
Enforcement Guidance].
125. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982) (finding that
housing testers had standing to sue under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604). The use of
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Generally, testers are paired together, usually one white tester and
one minority tester, given fictitious credentials and trained to respond to
potential employers. 126 At times, the credentials given to the member of
a protected class are slightly better than those given to the white

testers in housing discrimination cases differs substantially from the use of employment testers
with respect to the necessary credentials of the tester. 2 SPRIGGS, supra note 4, § 22.12[2], at 2263. Searching for a house to buy, or an apartment to rent, is not exactly the same as searching for
a job, and landlords will not be looking for the same level of qualification from renters as
employers will with job applicants. See 2 id. Essentially, it requires more training and
preparation to design credentials for individuals posing as job applicants than potential
homebuyers or renters. See 2 id.
126. See Kyles 1H,222 F.3d at 292; see also Anderson, supra note 10, at 1219-21. The use of
testers also presents an issue with respect to the protocols the testers must follow while in the
field. Ayres, supra note 2, at 822-23. Professor Ian Ayres conducted a testing program that
focused on buying new cars by sending several testers out to ninety Chicago car dealerships in an
effort to determine whether minorities would be treated differently than white male testers. Id.
Each tester employed the same bargaining tools, yet the results were dramatically different. Id. at
819, 822.
Professor Ayres developed distinct protocols for the testers to follow during the bargaining
process and instructed the testers to be concerned only with the price of the car. Id. at 823-24.
The testing project focused on the differences experienced between the initial price of the car the
testers were given and the final offers made after completing the negotiating process. Id. at 825.
The testers were trained to control their answers, including the tone of voice and inflection they
used in answering dealers' questions. Id. at 825-26. Though they were given uniform responses
to certain questions, the testers were also given the freedom to utilize a list of contingent
responses depending upon the questions asked by the dealer. Id. at 826. The process was
designed to let the sales people control the process without knowing they were doing so. Id.
Ayres' article also discussed the ethical ramifications of this testing project. Id. at 822 n. 18. In
order to avoid wasting the time of dealers because the testers had no intention of purchasing a car,
Ayres sent the pairs out during the least busy times for most dealerships. Id.; see also John T.
Sanders, How Ethical Is Investigative Testing?, EMP. TESTING - L. & POL'Y REP., Feb. 1994, at
17 (discussing the ethical considerations when utilizing testing programs and arguing that testing
is justified when it stems from an actual complaint, rather than the general goals of an antidiscrimination agency). Ultimately, the results of roughly 180 tests revealed that white males
were treated better than black males, white females or black females. Ayres, supra note 2, at 828.
As an example, the average dealer profit for final offers (following the completion of the
negotiation process) was $362 with white males, $504 with white females, $783 with black males
and $1,237 with black females. Id.
Finally, Ayres attempted to explain the results of this testing project and posited that the
disparities were best explained by a revenue-based theory. Id. at 845. Essentially, revenue-based
discrimination, according to Ayres, is based on a dealer's estimation of whether or not a particular
consumer is likely to shop around. Id. If the consumer is willing and readily able to shop around,
the dealer may be more willing to negotiate in order to earn the consumer's business. Id. If,
however, the dealer believes that the consumer cannot shop around for a better price, the dealer is
more likely to make a higher initial offer and less likely to negotiate the price down. Id. Often,
the testers were sent by the dealership to dealers of an identical racial background. Id. at 848.
Ayres theorizes that minority dealers may be better able to determine whether a minority
consumer is able and willing to shop around. Id. In addition, the more sophisticated a tester
seemed, based upon the contingent responses used by the tester, the more likely the dealer was to
negotiate, and vice versa. Id. at 848-49.
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tester. 127 The testers are then sent to the same employers and attempt to
complete the job interviewing process. 128 Upon completion of the
process, each tester will prepare a report of her experience, and the civil
rights organizations determine if discriminatory practices are being
used. 129 If the civil rights organization detects such practices, the testers
30
may pursue administrative and judicial remedies.'
Testing is valuable for several reasons. 131 First, evidence obtained
from testers is usually of probative value because the testing project can
be controlled for any variable. 132 By setting up the responses testers
will give to employers during interviews, civil rights organizations are
better able to monitor whether employers are engaging in discriminatory
practices. 133 Second, by creating the credentials for testers, one can

127. Kyles II, 222 F.3d at 292.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. If legal remedies are pursued, the testers will generally assign their right to damages
to the civil rights organization, so as to maintain objectivity and neutrality. Id.
131. 2 SPRIGGS, supra note 4, § 22.12[2], at 22-63 to 22-64; Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 410.
The Seventh Circuit has long noted the indispensable role testers play in eradicating
discrimination. Richardson v. Howard, 712 F.2d 319, 321-22 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the
district court committed reversible error when it discredited the "key testimony" of a witness
simply because of her status as professional housing tester). In Richardson v. Howard, the court
noted that:
It is frequently difficult to develop proof in discrimination cases and the evidence
provided by testers is frequently valuable, if not indispensable. It is surely regrettable
that testers must mislead commercial landlords and home owners as to their real
intentions to rent or buy housing. Nonetheless, we have long recognized that this
requirement of deception was a relatively small price to pay to defeat racial
discrimination. The evidence provided by testers both benefits unbiased landlords by
quickly dispelling false claims of discrimination and is a major resource in society's
continuing struggle to eliminate the subtle but deadly poison of racial discrimination.
We have discovered no case in which the credibility of testimony provided by a tester
has been questioned simply because of the tester's 'professional' status. Indeed, tester
evidence may well receive more weight because of its source. Testers seem more
likely to be careful and dispassionate observers of the events which lead to a
discrimination suit than individuals who are allegedly being discriminated against.
Id.
132. 2 SPRIGGS, supra note 4, § 22.12[2], at 22-63.
133. 2 id. For example, in the Ayres study, testers were trained to control their tone of voice
and inflection. Ayres, supra note 2, at 825-26. They were also given uniform responses to
certain questions and instructed on how to utilize a list of contingent responses depending upon
the questions posed by the car dealer. Id. at 826. Thus, Ayres was able to control the testers'
behavior and eliminate the effects of personality traits or negotiation skills from the picture,
thereby making race the only variable. See id. at 825-26. In the employment context, civil rights
organizations are similarly able to make testers more or less appealing by controlling how the
tester will dress, speak and respond to employers. See Kyles II, 222 F.3d at 292; see also
Anderson, supra note 10, at 1219-21. Furthermore, by creating or enhancing the credentials of
testers, organizations are able to ensure that applicants are equally qualified, leaving race as the
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make certain that the credentials of white and minority testers are at
least identical. 134 Third, the use of testers can corroborate the claims of
35
other individuals previously rejected for a position.1
Furthermore, the use of testers fills a gap in the enforcement of Title
VII with respect to low-skill, entry-level positions. 36 Because of the
high transaction costs associated with litigating claims of hiring
discrimination, under-enforcement of Title VII has resulted, and testing
projects "can uncover employment discrimination that otherwise is
unprovable because of its subtle form."' 137 Finally, testing is also
important because it highlights that racial discrimination still exists in
American society, something many Americans are not willing to
acknowledge. 138 While people's perceptions about race relations today
may not be the way they were during the Civil War, or during the
139
1960s, racism and discrimination have not been eliminated.
Employment testing is one way to continue working towards the goal of
140
Title VII, to eradicate discrimination from the workplace.
E. Knocking on the Courtroom Door: The Requirement of Standing
Although testers may accurately follow the procedure for properly
bringing a Title VII claim and may have a factually strong case of
discrimination, a ruling that testers lack standing will result in the

only variable for the employer to consider. Kyles 11,222 F.3d at 292; see also Anderson, supra
note 10, at 1219-21. Thus, when both white and minority testers share identical credentials and
qualifications, the inference is that the employer does not hire the minority tester because of her
minority status. See Kyles II, 222 F.3d at 292; see also Anderson, supra note 10, at 1219-21.
134. 2 SPRIGGS, supra note 4, § 22.12[21], at 22-63.
135. 2 id. at 22-64 (discussing a study conducted by the Fair Employment Council of Greater
Washington in 1992 that found discrimination against Hispanic testers 22.4% of the time).
136. Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 410.
137. Id. at 411,413. In response to Professor Yelnosky, Professor Leroy D. Clark argues that
testing would be an effective method for ferreting out discrimination on all levels, including highskill jobs. Leroy D. Clark, Employment Discrimination Testing: Theories of Standing and a
Reply to Professor Yelnosky, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1,21 (1994).
138. Haydon, supra note 3, at 1214-15 (discussing the concept of testing vis- -vis public
accommodations and the significant disparities in attitudes between whites and AfricanAmericans regarding the extent of discrimination in the United States). According to Haydon,
"when anecdotal evidence of the subtle forms that discrimination can take abounds, a healthy
paranoia may be warranted." Id. at 1215.
139. John F. Wymer III & Deborah A. Sudbury, Employment Discrimination "Testers "-Will
Your Hiring Practices "Pass?", 17 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 623 (1992) (discussing a then recent
study conducted by the Urban Institute to determine whether discrimination exists against
African-American job seekers and concluding that African-Americans experience discrimination
almost three times as often as white applicants); see also supra notes 1-3 (discussing the
economic and social effects of racism in the United States).
140. Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 410; Anderson, supra note 10, at 1236.
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14 1
dismissal of their lawsuit, effectively closing the courtroom door.
Because Article III of the United States Constitution limits the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to actual "cases or controversies," 142
testers can face challenges to their legal standing' 4 3 from the defendant
or the court itself.144
The central issue in relation to standing is whether a plaintiff has
alleged a sufficient injury to warrant judicial intervention. 145 Though
Article III of the Constitution establishes a constitutional limitation on
standing, the federal courts have also created judicially imposed
prudential requirements. 46 Nevertheless, Congress may enact a statute
that confers standing upon a plaintiff who would otherwise be barred
due to judicial standing requirements. 147 When Congress has done so,
148
the plaintiff must overcome the constitutional requirements only.
Otherwise, a plaintiff must overcome the judicially imposed prudential
49
requirements as well as the various constitutional requirements. 1

1. Constitutional Requirements
Article III establishes three requirements for standing. 5 ° First, the
plaintiff must establish that a case or controversy exists by alleging an
"injury in fact" that is "concrete and particularized."''
A plaintiff
asserting a right to have the government act in accordance with the law

141. LEWIS, supra note 16, at 509 (characterizing standing as a "potentially crippling
roadblock").
142. U.S. CONST. art. IlI, § 2, cl. 1; see LEWIS, supra note 16, at 509.
143. Supra note 15 and accompanying text (defining standing as a party's right to seek
judicial redress).
144. LEWIS, supra note 16, at 509.
145. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 75 (4th ed. 1991)
("Whether a party has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of the issues' is... 'the gist of
the question of federal standing."').
146. LEWIS, supra note 16, at 509.
147. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (holding that plaintiffs seeking to challenge a
town's zoning practices for excluding low to moderate income residents from the town lacked
standing to sue because they could not allege an injury the court was capable of redressing);
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 145, at 76; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 112 (2d ed. 1988).
148. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 145, at 76; TRIBE, supra note 147, at 112.
149. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 145, at 76; TRIBE, supra note 147, at 112.
150. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); TRIBE, supra note 147, at 111.
151. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding respondents lacked
standing because they did not demonstrate an injury in fact under the Endangered Species Act);
Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) (holding respondents had standing
under the Fair Housing Act to challenge real estate agents who steered prospective buyers to
specific areas by race); LEWIS, supra note 16, at 509; TRIBE, supra note 147, at I11.
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is not enough to make the injury concrete. 152 The best examples of
concrete and particularized injuries are economic injury or the threat of
criminal prosecution. 153 In addition to being concrete, the injury must
154
be "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical."'
Second, the injury must be "fairly traceable" to the defendant. 155 If
the plaintiff's alleged injury is not a result of conduct by the defendant,
courts will deny standing. 156 In Allen v. Wright,157 the Supreme Court
denied standing to African-American parents who challenged the grant
158
of tax exemptions by the IRS to racially discriminatory schools.
According to the Court, the connection between the schools'
discrimination and the granting of tax exempt status was "attenuated at
best."' 159 Thus, the plaintiffs failed to meet the second constitutional
requirement because there was no proof that the denial of tax exempt
status would eliminate the discrimination. 160 Due to the manner in
which it has been applied, this requirement has come under attack as a
way for judges to screen cases they substantively disfavor from their
dockets.161
The final constitutional provision requires that the injury will "likely"
be "redressed" by the court. 162 This requirement asks whether favorable
judicial relief will remove the plaintiff's burden or alleviate the
injury. 163 It is sometimes co-mingled with the causation requirement
because the defendant's actions may not be seen as the cause of the
plaintiff's injury if the court is unable to alleviate the burden on the
plaintiff with a favorable decision. 164 However, the redressability
152. LEWIS, supra note 16, at 509.
153. Eric J. Kuhn, Comment, Standing: Stood Up at the Courthouse Door, 63 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 886, 891-92 (1995).
154. LEWIS, supra note 16, at 509 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559
(1992)). For example, a plaintiff alleging only psychological harm from observing conduct with
which she disagrees is generally not enough to make the injury concrete. Id.
155. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; LEWIS, supra note 16, at 510; TRIBE, supra note 147, at 11I.
156. Kuhn, supra note 153, at 892-93 (discussing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984)).
157. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
158. Id. at 754-55.
159. Id. at 757.
160. Id. at 758.
161. TRIBE, supra note 147, at 130.
162. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (denying standing to African-American parents challenging the
grant of tax exempt status to schools practicing racial discrimination); TRIBE, supra note 147, at
111.
163. Kuhn, supra note 153, at 893.
164. TRIBE, supra note 147, at 129-30. In Warth v. Seldin, for example, the Supreme Court
denied standing to nonresidents of the defendant municipality who alleged that the town's zoning
practices intentionally excluded low to moderate income residents from the town. Warth v.
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requirement is usually distinguished from causation and treated
165
separately by the court.
2. Prudential Requirements
In addition to the Article III limitations on standing, judges have
imposed additional standing requirements to avoid questions of broad
social significance that do not vindicate any individual rights and to
limit judicial access to plaintiffs who are best suited to litigate a
claim. 166
First, the plaintiff cannot allege any "generalized

Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 493 (1975). According to the Court:
The Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury
to the complaining party, even though the court's judgment may benefit others
collaterally. A federal court's jurisdiction therefore can be invoked only when the
plaintiff himself has suffered "some threatened or actual injury resulting from the
putatively illegal action ....
"
Id. at 499. The individual plaintiffs argued that if the Court declared the defendant's zoning
practices unconstitutional, they would be able to find affordable housing within the town. Id. at
503.
The Court found, however, that "none of these petitioners has a present interest in any Penfield
property; none is himself subject to the ordinance's strictures; and none has ever been denied a
variance or permit by respondent officials." Id. at 504. As a result, the Court denied standing and
held:
[A] plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning practices must allege specific,
concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm him, and that he
personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention. Absent the
necessary allegations of demonstrable, particularized injury, there can be no confidence
of "a real need to exercise the power of judicial review" or that relief can be framed
"no broader than required by the precise facts to which the court's ruling would be
applied."
Id. at 508 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-22
(1974) (emphasis in original)).
165. Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19. The Court held:
The "fairly traceable" and "redressability" components of the constitutional standing
inquiry were initially articulated by this Court as "two facets of a single causation
requirement." To the extent there is a difference, it is that the former examines the
causal connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged injury,
whereas the latter examines the causal connection between the alleged injury and the
judicial relief requested. Cases such as this, in which the relief requested goes well
beyond the violation of law alleged, illustrate why it is important to keep the inquiries
separate if the "redressability" component is to focus on the requested relief. Even if
the relief respondents request might have a substantial effect on the desegregation of
public schools, whatever deficiencies exist in the opportunities for desegregated
education for respondents' children might not be traceable to IRS violations of
law-grants of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools in respondents'
communities.
id. (quoting C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13, at 68 n.43 (4th ed. 1983)); Kuhn, supra
note 153, at 893.
166. Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979) (stating that courts should
"avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated
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grievances."'' 67 This requirement means that the court will not hear
cases where the plaintiff's claim is indistinct from other citizens. 168 The
court will hear cases only when a large group of people is affected, but
not when an individual litigates to force the government to implement a
law properly. 169 In the latter situation, every citizen is affected
identically by the lack of implementation, and, thus, the plaintiff's
170
injury is not unique.
The second prudential limitation prevents the plaintiff from asserting
the rights of third parties, 17 1 which generally occurs when an association
attempts to bring a claim on behalf of its members. 172 This requirement
and to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim");
Kuhn, supra note 153, at 893-94.
167. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499, 518 (holding that plaintiffs seeking to challenge a town's zoning
practices for excluding low to moderate income residents from the town lacked standing to sue
because they could not allege an injury the court was capable of redressing); LEWIS, supra note
16, at 512. A "generalized grievance" is one in which the harm to the general population is no
different from the harm alleged by the particular plaintiff. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
In Clay v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, citizens of the town sought to require the school
board to consider an African-American candidate for superintendent. Clay v. Fort Wayne Cmty.
Sch., 76 F.3d 873, 874 (7th Cir. 1996). In holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the court
discussed that the plaintiffs "fail[ed] to allege so much as a scintilla of evidence that the harms
suffered by them are distinct from the harms suffered by the citizenry of Fort Wayne." Id. at 879.
168. Kuhn, supra note 153, at 895 (discussing the Court's disinclination to hear generalized
grievances).
169. Id. In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, a group of present and
former members of the Armed Forces Reserves brought suit to stop the United States'
involvement in Vietnam. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. 208, 210 n.1 (1974). The plaintiffs, in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers, challenged the military reserve membership of congressmen
as violative of the Incompatibility Clause of Article I, § 6, clause 2. Id. at 210-11. In discussing
their standing as citizens the Court noted that, "[tihe only interest all citizens share in the claim
advanced by respondents is one which presents injury in the abstract. Respondents seek to have
the Judicial Branch compel the Executive Branch to act in conformity with the Incompatibility
Clause, an interest shared by all citizens." Id. at 217. Furthermore,
[aill citizens, of course, share equally an interest in the independence of each branch of
Government. In some fashion, every provision of the Constitution was meant to serve
the interests of all. Such a generalized interest, however, is too abstract to constitute a
"case or controversy" appropriate for judicial resolution. The proposition that all
constitutional provisions are enforceable by any citizen simply because citizens are the
ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has no boundaries.
Id. at 226-27. Accordingly, the Court denied the plaintiffs standing because their claim amounted
only to a generalized grievance. Id. at 227-28.
170. Kuhn, supra note 153, at 895.
171. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500; LEWIS, supra note 16, at 512.
172. Kuhn, supra note 153, at 894. In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Commission, the Washington State Apple Advertising Commission challenged a North Carolina
statute regulating the grade of apples brought into the state as violative of the Commerce Clause.
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 335 (1977). North Carolina
challenged the standing of the Commission on the grounds that the Commission lacked a personal
stake in the outcome of the litigation because the Commission did not engage in the production,
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prohibits the plaintiff from asserting the rights of parties not present in
the litigation. 17 3 It also seeks to prevent premature judicial intervention,
show respect for the decisions of third parties not to be part of the
litigation, and ensure concrete and sharp presentation of the issues by
those parties who are representing their own rights. 174 The third-party
standing requirement has several exceptions, however, which seemingly
undermine the rule. 175 Both generally, and because of those exceptions,
the third-party standing requirement is similar to the "zone of interests"
requirement. 176
The final prudential limitation on standing is known as the "zone of
interests" requirement. 177 To meet this requirement, the plaintiff must
fall within the zone of interests of the statute under which the plaintiff
invokes standing. 178 The limitation focuses on whether Congress
intended for the plaintiff to seek remedy within the courts179 and often

sale or shipment of apples into North Carolina. Id. at 341. The Court noted that associations
have standing "when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right;
(b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit." Id. at 343. Because the Commission met the associational standing requirements and
operated no differently from a traditional trade association, the Court held that it had standing to
sue on behalf of its members. Id. at 344-45.
173. TRIBE, supra note 147, at 135-36.
174. Id. at 136.
175. Clay v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 76 F.3d 873, 878 n.5 (7th Cir. 1996); TRIBE, supra note
147, at 136-42 (discussing the growing number of exceptions to this requirement); see supra note
167 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Clay v. Fort Wayne Community School). In
Clay, the Seventh Circuit noted that, "[e]xceptions to the third-party standing rule are permitted
where it would be difficult if not impossible for the harmed individual to present his claims
before the court. In such cases, courts have permitted plaintiffs to advance claims on behalf of
incapacitated third parties." Clay, 76 F.3d at 878 n.5 (citations omitted).
According to Professor Laurence Tribe, "[tihe third-party standing rule is frequently relaxed in
cases '[w]here practical obstacles prevent a party from asserting rights on behalf of itself and
where the litigant 'can reasonably be expected properly to frame the issues and present them with
the necessary adversary zeal."' TRIBE, supra note 147, at 136. Tribe argues, however, that these
exceptions are in name only, and are "more persuasively rationalized as sub silentio recognitions
of first-party rights-of interests of the litigant that are purportedly interfered with by the
challenged action. This reformulation of third-party standing emphasizes how closely the
doctrine correlates with the inquiry framed by the zone-of-interests test." Id. (emphasis in
original).
176. TRIBE, supra note 147, at 136.
177. Air Courier Conf. of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1991)
(denying standing to postal employees' unions challenging the United States Postal Services'
decision to suspend the Private Express Statutes); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)
(denying standing to African-American parents who challenged the grant of tax exemptions by
the IRS to racially discriminatory schools); TRIBE, supra note 147, at 142.
178. TRIBE, supra note 147, at 142; Kuhn, supra note 153, at 895.
179. TRIBE, supra note 147, at 142-43.
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arises when litigants challenge agency action under the Administrative
Procedure Act. 180 To determine whether the plaintiff falls within the
statute's zone of interests, the court must look to the legislative history
and language of the statute involved. 18 1 While these prudential
limitations are relevant, they can be avoided in cases where a federal
statute clearly intends to extend standing under that statute to the limits
of Article 111.182
F. Decisions in the Lower Courts Regarding Tester Standing
Prior to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Kyles IL,183 a few federal
district courts considered the issue of employment testers in the context
of employment discrimination suits under Title VII. 184 With one
federal courts were not
exception, these cases reveal that the lower
85
receptive to the idea of employment testing. 1
1. An Initial Case on the Merits Revealed Grim Prospects for Testers:
Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Company, Inc.
One of the earliest cases dealing directly with the issue of
employment testers was Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Company, Inc.
In Sledge I, thirteen African-American
("Sledge I") in 1975.186
plaintiffs brought a class action suit alleging discrimination claims
under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.187 Following an arduous

180. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994); Ass'n of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (stating that "the Administrative Procedure Act
grants standing to a person 'aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute'); Kuhn, supra note 153, at 895.
181. Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984) (noting that the court must look
to the express language of the statute, the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its
legislative history, and the nature of the administrative action involved when determining whether
the relevant statute precludes judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act); Kuhn,
supra note 153, at 895.
182. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 145, at 76; TRIBE, supra note 147, at 112.
222 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2000).
183. Kyles 11,
184. Kyles I, No. 97 C 8311, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15428 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 1998) (holding
that employment testers lack standing under Title VII); Sledge 1,No. 1201, 1975 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14689 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 22, 1975) (dismissing the Title VII claim of an apparent "test"
plaintiff on the merits). Contra BMC 1, 829 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding that
employment testers have standing under Title VII), rev'd, BMC H, 28 F.3d 1268, 1272, 1274
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
185. Kyles 1, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15428, at *10-11 (holding that employment testers lack
standing under Title VII); Sledge 1, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14689, at *6-7 (dismissing the Title
VII claim of an apparent "test" plaintiff on the merits). Contra BMC 1, 829 F. Supp. at 407-08
(holding that employment testers have standing under Title VII).
186. Sledge I, No. 1201, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14689 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 22, 1975).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994); Sledge !, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14689, at *1. Section 1981
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procedural history, 188 the district court dismissed the claims of the
individual plaintiffs but proceeded to render a decision on the merits
with respect to the class as a whole by finding the defendant liable for
discrimination. 189 The court then issued three types of relief for the
class members, including enjoining all racially discriminatory practices
by the defendant, awarding back pay to class members, and awarding
attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs.'9o
The court confronted the issue of employment testing, however, in its
19 1
decision to dismiss the claims of one of the named plaintiffs.
Thomas Hawkins, an African-American male, applied for a job with the
defendant on July 21, 1969 and listed one of the plaintiffs' attorneys as
a personal reference. 19 2 The defendant rejected Hawkins for
employment, and five days later, Hawkins filed a charge with the
EEOC. 193 In dismissing the individual claim filed by Hawkins for
failing to prove that his rejection was racially motivated, the district
court also suspected that Hawkins was not genuinely interested in the
job and merely filed an application in order to join the lawsuit. 194 While
grants "[a]ll persons ... the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by
white citizens ... " 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a); Sledge 1, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14689, at *60. Title
VII claims are often combined with § 1981 claims because the plaintiff will argue that in utilizing
discriminatory practices the defendant not only violated Title VII, but also violated § 1981 by
unlawfully prohibiting the plaintiff from entering an employment contract. Michelle Landever,
Note, Tester Standing in Employment Discrimination Cases Under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 41 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 381, 386-87 (1993) (arguing that testers have standing under § 1981).
188. Sledge 1, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14689, at *1, *62-63. In November 1972, a bench trial
was held on the plaintiffs' Title VII and § 1981 claims. Id. at *1. Following further arguments in
the spring of 1973, the district court took the case under advisement in order to wait for a decision
in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). Id. The court awaited the Albemarle
decision because it involved a similar back pay issue central to the issue in Sledge I. Id.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Albemarle, the Sledge I court issued its opinion in
December 1975. Id.
While the Sledge I court dismissed the individuals claims of the named plaintiffs, a procedural
anomaly exists that allows class action suits to proceed even after the claims of all named
plaintiffs are dismissed in the Fourth Circuit. Id. at *62-63. In employment discrimination class
actions in the Fourth Circuit, dismissal or mootness of individual plaintiffs does not destroy their
ability to litigate claims on behalf of the entire class. Id. at *62. Based on this procedural twist,
the Sledge I court found the defendant liable for discrimination because it failed to rebut the
plaintiffs' prima facie case. Id. at *62-63, *68. Accordingly, the Sledge I court awarded classwide relief. Id. at *68.
189. Id. at *68, *76.
190. Id. at *68.
191. Id. at *6-7.
192. Id. at *5, *6.
193. Id. at *6.
194. Id. at *6-7. According to the Sledge I court, it had "the impression that Hawkins was not
seriously seeking employment with Stevens but rather filed his application ... with the view to
joining this lawsuit." Id.
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the district court did not explicitly call Hawkins a tester, the Fourth
95
Circuit would soon place that label on him. 1
2. Tester Standing is Squarely Confronted for the First Time: Fair
Employment Council of GreaterWashington v. BMC Marketing Corp.
Over two decades later, the standing of employment testers would be
directly confronted by a district court in the District of Columbia in Fair
Employment Council of Greater Washington v. BMC Marketing Corp.
("BMC r').19 6 In BMC I, two African-American testers and a civil
rights organization brought claims under the District of Columbia
Human Rights Act,' 97 Title VII and § 1981.198 The Fair Employment
Council of Greater Washington sent both African-American and white
testers to the defendant employment agency in search of job referrals. 199
The white testers, who had comparable qualifications to the AfricanAmerican testers, received job referrals, while the African-American
200
testers did not receive referrals.
The defendants argued that the individual plaintiffs lacked standing
because the testers admitted that they were not genuinely interested in
receiving a job referral. 2 ° ' In examining the standing of the testers
under Title VII, the district court first noted the constitutional
requirements imposed by Article III as well as the judicially imposed
prudential standing requirements. 20 2 The court then reviewed the
Supreme Court's holding that housing testers suffer a sufficient injury
for claims brought under the Fair Housing Act20 3 ("FHA"). 2° The
district court then found the provision of Title VII which establishes a
right to nondiscriminatory job referrals 20 5 remarkably similar to the

195. See infra Part III.A (discussing the Fourth Circuit's view that testers do not allege a
sufficient injury because they are not genuinely interested in the job, but allowing Hawkins the
opportunity to show that he was a bona fide job applicant).
196. BMC 1, 829 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1993).
197. District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512(b) (1981); BMC I,
829 F. Supp. at 403.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1994); BMC 1, 829 F. Supp. at 403.
199. BMC 1, 829 F. Supp. at 403.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.; see also supra Part II.E (discussing the constitutional and judicially imposed standing
requirements).
203. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1994).
204. BMC 1, 829 F. Supp. at 404 (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373
(1982)).
205. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1994).
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FHA and held that employment testers suffer a sufficient injury to
2 °6
confer standing under Title VII.
The defendant also argued that the testers lacked standing with
respect to the testers' claim for injunctive relief.20 7 Relying upon City
of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 20 8 the defendants argued that the testers failed
to show that they would be subject to future injury. 209 The district
court, however, distinguished BMC I from Lyons by stating that the
testers in BMC I had the power to return to the defendant agency and
seek another referral. 210 Thus, the court believed that the testers could
easily demonstrate a probability of future injury. 2 11 Accordingly, the
district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of
standing under Title VII. 2 12 Though the initial response by this court
was favorable, the District of Columbia Circuit would see things
differently on appeal.213
3. A Setback for Employment Testers: Kyles v. J.K. GuardianSecurity
Services, Inc.
Only a few short years after testers received a favorable reception
from a district court in BMC 1,214 another federal district court squarely
confronted the issue of tester standing in Kyles v. J.K. Guardian
Security Services, Inc. ("Kyles /').

2 15

In Kyles I, two African-American

female testers, using fictitious credentials, applied for a job with the
defendant security agency. 2 16
Hired by the Legal Assistance
Foundation of Chicago to participate in a testing program, the women
had no interest in the job and were required to refuse any offers for

206. BMC 1, 829 F. Supp. at 404.
207. Id. at 405.
208. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). Lyons involved an African-American
motorist pulled over by the Los Angeles Police Department who was subjected to a dangerous
chokehold. Id. at 97. The plaintiff sought to enjoin officers from using chokeholds in the future,
id. at 100, but the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not prove he would be subjected to
future injury, id. at 108. Because the police controlled whether the plaintiff would be pulled over
again, the Court considered it "speculation" that Lyons would be injured in the future. Id. at 108.
Accordingly, the Court denied the plaintiff injunctive relief. Id.
209. BMC 1, 829 F. Supp. at 405.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 408.
213. See infra Part III.B (discussing the District of Columbia Circuit's holding in BMC II, 28
F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
214. BMCI, 829 F. Supp. at 408.
215. Kyles I, No. 97 C 8311, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15428 (N.D. I11.
Sept. 18, 1998).
216. ld.at *l1-2.
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employment.2 17 Both testers interviewed with the defendant, but neither
received an offer. 2 18 Through the Legal Assistance Foundation of
Chicago, both testers subsequently brought claims for employment
discrimination under Title VII and § 1981219 seeking compensatory and
22 1
punitive damages, 220 injunctive relief and attorneys' fees and costs.
The defendant also filed state law counterclaims for fraud and
misrepresentation against the plaintiffs, and both parties moved for
summary judgment.

222

In examining whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue under Title
VII or § 1981, the district court first considered the constitutional
requirements of Article 111223 and the judicially imposed prudential
standing requirements. 224 The court held that the plaintiffs failed to
meet the constitutional requirement of "injury in fact" because they
were not genuinely interested in the job.22 5 Absent a genuine interest,
the court concluded that the plaintiffs could not be injured by the
defendant's refusal to hire them. 226 Furthermore, Article III limitations
prevented the court from addressing abstract questions of wide public
significance.

227

After finding that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing, the district
court next examined their standing under Title VII and § 1981
together. 228 The court then held that the plaintiffs also lacked statutory

217. Id. at *2.
218. Id.
219. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between § 1981
and Title VII claims).
220. Kyles 1, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15428, at *1. The plaintiffs sought compensatory
damages as a result of the amendments to Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See supra
Part II.A (discussing the legislative history of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
221. Kyles!, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15428, at *1.
222. Id. Interestingly, the district court neglected to give a factual account of the treatment of
the white testers by the defendant. Id. Because the court was required to read all facts in a light
most favorable to the plaintiffs, as it granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, a
more descriptive factual account may have been warranted. Id. at *2-3.
223. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see supra Part II.E.I (discussing the constitutional
standing requirements).
224. Kyles 1, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15428, at *4-7; see supra Part II.E.2 (discussing the
prudential standing requirements imposed by courts).
225. Kyles 1, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15428, at *5-6.
226. Id.
227. Id. at *7 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). According to the district
court, the plaintiffs' "summer work was championing the rights of humanity at large against
racial discrimination ... [and] federal courts are not the proper forums to address the rights of
humanity at large." Id. at *6. Both testers were students at Northwestern University and were
hired as testers for a summer job. Id. at * 1-2.
228. Id. at *7-10; see supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship
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standing because they were not bona fide job applicants. 229 Though
standing is a procedural matter distinct from the merits of a case, the
court discussed whether the plaintiffs were bona fide applicants within
the context of a plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination. 230 By
doing so, the court equated the standing requirements
with the
23 1
requirements for making a prima facie case on the merits.
The Kyles I court also distinguished the use of housing testers232 on
the grounds that Title VII and § 1981 confer narrower rights than the
Fair Housing Act, 233 and, thus, housing testers can be injured without
being bona fide applicants. 234 Conversely, the Kyles I court concluded
that employment testers cannot be injured unless they are genuinely
interested in the job.2 35 Finally, the court then drew upon the District of
Columbia Circuit's decision in Fair Employment Council of Greater
Washington v. BMC Marketing Corp.2 36 and held that the Kyles I
plaintiffs lacked standing under Title VII for injunctive relief because
there was no threat of future harm.237 Upon holding that the plaintiffs in
Kyles I lacked standing for their Title VII and § 1981238 claims, the

between § 1981 and Title VII claims).
229. Kyles 1, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15428, at *10.
230. Id. at *7-8.
231. Id.; see discussion infra Part III.C (noting the distinction between the elements of a
plaintiff's prima facie case and the requirement of standing made by the Seventh Circuit in Kyles
H, 222 F.3d 289, 299-300 (7th Cir. 2000)).
232. Kyles 1, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15428, at *9-10. The BMC I court relied on the
similarities between housing and employment testers as well as the similarities between Title VII
and the FHA in holding that the employment testers in BMC I had standing to sue. BMC 1, 829 F.
Supp. 402, 404 (D.D.C. 1993). While the BMC I court relied upon the Supreme Court's decision
in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), the Kyles I court apparently did not
find the Havens decision dispositive. Kyles 1, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15428, at *9-10; 2
SPRIGGS, supra note 4, § 22.12[3], at 22-67 to 22-68.
233. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1994).
234. Kyles 1, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15428, at *9-10.
235. Id. at *10.
236. Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington v. BMC Marketing Corp., 28 F.3d
1269 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also infra Part III.B (discussing the District of Columbia Circuit's
holding that testers lack standing to sue in Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington v.
BMC Marketing Corp., 28 F.3d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
237. Kyles 1, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15428, at *8; see also infra Part III.B (discussing the
District of Columbia Circuit's finding that a lack of future harm precluded the testers from having
standing).
238. The court gave cursory treatment to the plaintiffs' § 1981 standing but held that they
lacked standing under that statute because § 1981 does not protect the right to refuse to enter an
employment contract or to enter a void contract. Kyles 1, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15428, at *9;
see also infra Part IIIB (surveying the District of Columbia Circuit's holding regarding the
employment testers claims for equitable relief).
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court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and
239
relinquished jurisdiction of the defendant's state law counterclaims.
III. DISCUSSION
In the lower federal courts, employment testers did not receive a
favorable response in either the Fourth or Seventh Circuits, but they had
some success in the District of Columbia. 24° On appeal, however, a
sentiment disfavoring testers remained the status quo in the Fourth
Circuit, 24 1 while the Seventh Circuit and the District of Columbia
Circuit each reversed the results reached by their respective lower
242

courts.

A. The Fourth Circuit Still Does Not Favor Testers: Sledge v. J.P.
Stevens & Company, Inc.
When the Fourth Circuit heard Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Company,
Inc. ("Sledge II,")243 on appeal, it considered whether the individual
discrimination claims brought by Thomas Hawkins, whose genuine
interest in employment with the defendant was seriously questioned by
245
the district court, 244 were properly dismissed on their merits.
Ultimately, Hawkins received a minor reprieve, but one that did not
really amount to acceptance of employment testers. 246 On appeal, eight
of the thirteen individual plaintiffs challenged the dismissal of their
claims, the defendant challenged the finding of discrimination by the
district court, and the plaintiffs also challenged the back-pay claim
24 7
filing requirements imposed by the district court.

239. Kyles 1, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15428, at *10-11.
240. See id. (holding that employment testers lack standing under Title VII); Sledge 1, No.
1201, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14689 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 22, 1975) (dismissing the Title VII claim of
an apparent "test" plaintiff on the merits). But see BMC 1, 829 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1993)
(holding that employment testers have standing under Title VII), rev'd, BMC II, 28 F.3d 1268,
1272, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that testers do not have standing to seek monetary or
equitable relief under Title VII); see also supra Parts II.F. 1-3 (discussing lower court decisions
regarding tester standing).
241. Sledge 11, 585 F.2d 625, 641 (4th Cir. 1978); see also infra Part III.A (discussing the
Fourth Circuit's unfavorable treatment of testers).
242. Kyles II, 222 F.3d 289, 300 (7th Cir. 2000); BMC 11, 28 F.3d 1268, 1272-73 (D.C. Cir.
1994); see also infra Parts III.B-C (discussing the District of Columbia and Seventh Circuits'
treatment of testers).
243. Sledge II, 585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978).
244. Sledge 1, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14689, at *6-7.
245. Sledge 11, 585 F.2d at 641.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 633.
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Before deciding the validity of the named plaintiffs' claims, the
Fourth Circuit held that the district court properly found the defendant
liable for discrimination, except with respect to the defendant's
seniority system. 248 The court then turned to the individual plaintiffs
and noted that all of the individual plaintiffs had three common
characteristics. 249 First, dismissal of their claims only affected the
awarding of back-pay. 250 Second, the timing of dismissals altered the
criteria on appeal because the district court bifurcated the trial.2
Finally, even though bifurcation was acceptable, the individual
plaintiffs should not be subjected to a higher burden of proof simply
because each testified before the district court found class-wide
252
discrimination.
The Sledge H court then examined each of the named plaintiffs'
individual claims.2 5 3 Five of the individual plaintiffs were employees of
the defendant at some point, two were unsuccessful applicants, and the
remaining plaintiff, Thomas Hawkins, appeared to be a tester. 254 While
248. Id. at 636; see supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural
treatment of the case by the district court). The Fourth Circuit noted that the finding of
discrimination by the district court as to the defendant's seniority system was erroneous because
Title VII exempts seniority systems. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1994);
Sledge 11, 585 F.2d at 636. An employer's seniority system is exempt from Title VII so long as
the system does not intentionally discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h); Sledge 1I, 585 F.2d at 636. Specifically, Title VII provides that,
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different
standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings
by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations,
provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). Because the plaintiffs in Sledge 11 did not challenge the bona fide nature
of the defendant's seniority system, the court reversed the findings that the system violated Title
VII and § 1981. Sledge I, 585 F.2d at 636.
249. Sledge I1, 585 F.2d at 636-39.
250. Id. at 637.
Because the other relief granted was an injunction against future
discrimination, and the named plaintiffs were not eliminated from the class, the only remedy they
would be deprived of by dismissal was back pay. Id.
251. Id. The appellate court noted that once liability for discrimination of the class as a whole
is proven, it is assumed that the individual decisions were discriminatory as well. Id. The burden
then shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate justification for the decision, and if that burden
is met, the plaintiffs have an opportunity to show the explanation is pretextual. Id. In this case,
however, the district court dismissed the individual claims before proceeding with respect to the
class as a whole. Id. Thus, on appeal, the court can only affirm the dismissal of the individual
claims if it is clear the plaintiff is not a class member, or if the defendant had an "acceptable and
unassailable" reason for its actions. Id. at 638.
252. Id. at 638.
253. Id. at 639-43.
254. Id. at 641. The court's opinion does not indicate that a civil rights organization hired
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discussing Hawkins' individual claims, the court questioned the same
facts mentioned by the district court.2 55 Specifically, the Sledge II court
commented on the sequence of Hawkins' application and rejection for a
job with the defendant and his subsequent filing of an EEOC charge
within five days of that rejection. 25 6 In addition, the court found it
suspicious that Hawkins listed one of the plaintiffs' attorneys as a
257
reference on his job application.
The court also discussed the district court's impression that Hawkins
was a "test" plaintiff and for the first time clearly stated that testers are
not harmed when they are not hired because they are not genuinely
interested in the job. 258 However, the Sledge II court reversed the
Hawkins in the same manner that most testers are hired. Id. The opinions, at both the district and
appellate levels, merely express skepticism over Hawkins' interest in the job. Id.; Sledge I, No.
1201, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14689, at *6-7 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 22, 1975). Specifically, both courts
note that one of Hawkins' references was one of the plaintiffs' attorneys, and that Hawkins filed
his EEOC charge only five days after being rejected by the defendant. Sledge 11, 585 F.2d at 641;
Sledge 1, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14689, at *6. Thus, it appears that Hawkins could have been
recruited as a tester of sorts, but there is no conclusive proof of that fact in the courts' opinions.
Sledge 11, 585 F.2d at 641; Sledge 1, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14689, at *6-7.
255. Sledge 11, 585 F.2d at 641; Sledge !, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14689, at *5-6.
256. Sledge 11, 585 F.2d at 641.
257. Id.
258. The Fourth Circuit stated that, "[sluch 'test' plaintiffs are not, of course, harmed by a
refusal to hire since they are not seriously interested in the job for which they apply." Id. (citing
Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1971)). Lea v. Cone Mills Corp. actually
represents the first case that implicates the issue of testing. Lea, 438 F.2d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 197 1).
Lea pre-dates Sledge I by only four years but considers an award of back pay and attorneys fees
to the plaintiffs. Id. at 87. The plaintiffs in Lea, a group of African-American women, instituted
a class action alleging violations of Title VII because the defendant hired white females and
African-American males, but not African-American females. Id. The district court enjoined the
defendant's conduct, finding it discriminatory, but did not allow back pay to the plaintiffs. Id. at
87, 88. The Fourth Circuit affirmed that finding. Id. The district court also disallowed an award
of attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs, but the Fourth Circuit reversed that decision. Id. at 88.
Though the district court believed the plaintiffs' motivation was to "test" the defendant's
employment practices, and the appellate court agreed with that conclusion, the majority in Lea
relied upon Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968), in holding that the
"[pilaintiffs should not be denied attorneys' fees merely because theirs was a 'test case."' Id.
In his dissent/concurrence, Judge Boreman agreed with the majority's finding that a Title VII
violation had occurred, but vehemently disagreed that the plaintiffs were entitled to attorneys'
fees. Id. (Boreman, J., dissenting). According to Boreman, the district court's decision to
disallow attorneys' fees should only be disturbed if there is a clear showing of abuse of
discretion. Id. (Boreman, J., dissenting). Boreman believed there was no such abuse by the
district court in this case. Id. (Boreman, J., dissenting). According to him, the district court was
correct because the plaintiffs in Lea were merely pawns or puppets in a case that "smacks of
nothing but manufactured litigation." Id. at 90 (Boreman, J., dissenting). The plaintiffs did not
know the attorneys involved, merely signed identical charges filed with the EEOC, and it was
clear that the attorneys would not seek fees from the plaintiffs if the case was not successful. Id.
at 89 (Boreman, J., dissenting). Overall, Boreman's opposition to the award of fees was based
primarily on the fact that the plaintiffs appeared to be testers. Id. at 89-91 (Boreman, J.,
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dismissal of Hawkins' claims because he was not given the chance to
prove whether he was a bona fide applicant. 259 While this apparent
tester received a small reprieve, the language of both the District and
Fourth Circuit Courts clearly indicated that testers do not suffer an
260
injury sufficient enough to give them legal standing to sue.
Furthermore, even though the decisions in Sledge I and Sledge II
addressed the merits of the case, the overall treatment testers received
26 1
did not establish strong precedent for tester standing.
B. The Courtroom Door is Slammed Shut: Fair Employment Council of
Greater Washington v. BMC Marketing Corp.
Unlike Sledge II, in which the Fourth Circuit only questioned the
nature of Thomas Hawkins' discrimination claims, 262 the District of
Columbia Circuit in Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington
v. BMC Marketing Corp. ("BMC I") flatly rejected the standing of two

dissenting).
While the Lea decision moderately raised the issue of whether testers suffer an injury, the
Sledge 1Hcourt only relied upon Lea as an example of a decision in which the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the disallowance of back pay to "test" plaintiffs. Sledge 11, 585 F.2d at 641. However,
the Sledge II court's decision strikes closer to the issue of tester standing because the Sledge II
court actually discusses whether testers suffer an injury. Id. The Lea decision speaks more to
whether test plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys' fees. Lea, 438 F.2d at 88.
259. Sledge I1,585 F.2d at 641.
260. Id.; Sledge 1, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14689, at *6-7.
261. Sledge 11, 585 F.2d at 641; Sledge 1, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14689, at *6. Nearly two
decades after both Sledge and Lea, a district court in Georgia considered Parrv. Woodmen of the
World Life Insurance Society, a case on the merits apparently involving another "test" plaintiff.
Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 657 F. Supp. 1022 (M.D. Ga. 1987). The plaintiff
in Parr was a white male who filed claims under Title VII and § 1981 alleging that he was not
hired by the defendant because he was married to a black woman. Id. at 1022. The district court
initially granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the case, but that ruling was overturned by the
Eleventh Circuit. Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888 (1 1th Cir. 1986).
The case was then remanded back to the district court, where a bench trial ensued. Parr, 657 F.
Supp. at 1022.
According to the district court, the plaintiff proved all but one of the elements of his prima facie
case because he failed to prove that he "applied" for a job with the defendant as he was not
genuinely interested in the job. Id. at 1032. Put simply, the plaintiff was only attempting to
create a basis for an EEOC charge and a Title VII claim by applying for a job with the defendant
and informing them that he was married to an African-American woman. Id. at 1032-33. Since
he could not be considered a bona fide job applicant, the court saw him as a "test" plaintiff who
suffered no injury, id. (quoting Sledge 1I, 585 F.2d 625, 641 (4th Cir. 1978)), in a case that
"'smacks of nothing but ...[litigation manufactured by plaintiff Parr],"' id. at 1033 (quoting Lea
v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86, 90 (4th Cir. 1971) (Boreman, J., dissenting)). As a result,
judgment was entered for the defendant. Id. Though a decision on the merits as well, the Parr
decision represents another example where the court seriously questioned the validity of a tester
and utilized the language developed by the Sledge and Lea courts to do so. Id.
262. Sledge 11, 585 F.2d at 641.
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employment testers under Title VII. 263 In so doing, the BMC II court
2 64
established clear precedent against tester standing.
The BMC II court first addressed the testers' claims for monetary
damages. 265 The court held that because the alleged discrimination took
place in 1990, at a time when Title VII only allowed for equitable
relief, 266 the statute could not be applied retroactively. 267 Thus, the
testers could not recover damages. 268 The BMC II court also held that
the testers lacked standing for injunctive relief because they did not
sufficiently allege that they would be subject to any future harm or
discrimination.26 9 While the district court distinguished the case,27 ° the
circuit court relied upon City of Los Angeles v. Lyons 27 1 to find that the
testers in BMC II failed to demonstrate any threat of future
discrimination from the defendants.2 72 The plaintiffs' complaint alleged
that the testers would continue to feel the effects of the past
discrimination. 273 According to the BMC II court, however, the
complaint did not sufficiently allege that the testers would actually
return to the defendant agency and be subject to discriminatory conduct
again.

27 4

263. BMC II, 28 F.3d 1268, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also supra note 187 and
accompanying text (discussing the interplay between Title VII and § 1981 claims). The court
first held that the testers did not have standing under § 1981 because they did not allege an injury
cognizable under the statute. BMC I, 28 F.3d at 1270-72. The reasons for this conclusion were
twofold. Id. First, the testers only lost an opportunity to enter a void contract with defendant if
they had received employment referrals from the defendant because they used false information
in applying. Id. Second, the plaintiffs were only deprived of the right to refuse to enter a contract
with prospective employers because the plaintiffs were required to reject any job offer they
received. Id. Thus, the plaintiffs lacked standing because § 1981 does not protect the right to
enter invalid contracts, nor does it protect a person's right to refuse to enter a contract. Id.
264. BMC II, 28 F.3d at 1270-74.
265. Id. at 1272.
266. Prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, only equitable relief was allowed
under Title VII. CATHCART, supra note 62 § 1.01, at 2, 9; see also supra Part ll.A (discussing
the legislative history of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
267. BMC II, 28 F.3d at 1272.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1274.
270. BMCI, 829 F. Supp. 402,405 (D.D.C. 1993).
271. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); see supra note 208 and accompanying
text (discussing the facts of Lyons); see also supra Part II.F.2 (discussing how the District of
Columbia District Court distinguished the employment testers' claims for equitable relief from
Lyons in BMCI, 829 F. Supp. 402,405 (D.D.C. 1993)).
272. BMC 1I, 28 F.3d at 1272-73.
273. Id. at 1273.
274. Id.
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The district court distinguished Lyons on the ground that the testers
controlled whether they would return to BMC for a referral.2 75
However, the circuit court viewed that fact as merely a possibility,
rather than something likely to occur. 276 To the District of Columbia
Circuit, there was no likelihood that the testers would return because
they were known to BMC, and BMC no longer had a duty to continue to
consider the testers for referrals because of the testers' deception. 277 In
addition, even if the testers did return, there was no guarantee that BMC
would actually discriminate against them. 27 8 As a result, the testers in
BMC H were just like the plaintiff in Lyons who could not control
whether he would be pulled over and choked again. 279 The court
concluded that absent any showing that future harm is likely, rather than
a remote possibility, the testers did not have standing for any type of
280
relief under Title VII.
Accordingly, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district
court's finding and remanded the case. 281 Ultimately, the BMC H court
negatively answered only half of the standing question by denying the
plaintiffs' standing for equitable relief because Title VII precluded
recovery of monetary damages at the time of the alleged
discrimination. 282 However, the BMC II decision, combined with the
treatment of testers in the Fourth Circuit,2 83 apparently shut the
courtroom door on employment testers.
C. Finally, the Knock is Answered: Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Security
Services, Inc.
The courtroom door opened wide with the Seventh Circuit's
landmark ruling in Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Security Services, Inc.
("Kyles I/,,).284 At the outset of its opinion, the Seventh Circuit

275. BMC 1, 829 F. Supp. at 405.
276. BMC 1I, 28 F.3d at 1273.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983); BMC 11, 28 F.3d at 1274; see
also supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of Lyons).
280. BMC II, 28 F.3d at 1274.
281. Id. at 1281.
282. Id. at 1272.
283. See supra Parts II.F.I (surveying the district court's decision in Sledge I, No. 1201, 1975
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14689 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 22, 1975)), HI.A (detailing the Fourth Circuit's decision
in Sledge II, 585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978)).
284. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d 289, 300 (7th Cir. 2000). At the time the plaintiffs entered the
courtroom in Kyles 1,there was little precedent supporting their argument for standing under Title
VII and § 1981. See supra Parts II.F.I.3, IILA-B (discussing the unfavorable treatment testers
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explained the nature of employment testing, 285 as well as the particular
project in which the plaintiffs participated.28 6 In addition, the Kyles H
court provided more detail than the district court did as to how the white
and African-American testers were treated by the defendant. 287 The
Kyles H court described how both white testers who applied for the
same jobs as the plaintiffs were offered a position, while the plaintiffs
288
did not receive an offer.
The court then canvassed the constitutional 289 and prudential 29°
standing requirements any plaintiff must overcome. 29 1 The court also
noted that these limitations are generally used because it is judicial
policy to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no
individual rights are vindicated.2 92 The Seventh Circuit discussed,
however, that Congress has the power to extend standing to the limits of
Article III, and if it does so, the court cannot deny standing. 293 Thus,
the Kyles H court recognized that Congress can create legal rights via
294
statute, where those rights would not exist absent the statute.
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit determined that the Article III
295
standing of the testers in this case depended upon whether Title VII,
296
the applicable statute, confers standing.
received in the district and circuit courts in the Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits). As a
result, perhaps, the Kyles I court denied the testers standing and granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment. Kyles 1, No. 97 C 8311, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15428, *10-11 (N.D. I11.
Sept. 18, 1998).
285. See supra Part II.D (explaining the concept of employment testing).
286. Kyles II, 222 F.3d at 292-93.
287. Compare id. at 292-93 (providing a detailed factual account of the experiences of both
tester plaintiffs, including comparing their experience with the white testers), with Kyles 1, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15428, at *1-2 (giving a cursory review of the facts and eliminating any detail
as to how the white testers were treated).
288. Kyles II, 222 F.3d at 292-93.
289. The Article III requirements include: 1) an injury in fact that is a) concrete and
particularized, and b) actual or imminent, not hypothetical, 2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
defendant, and 3) the injury is redressable. Id. at 294; see also supra Part II.E. I (discussing the
constitutional standing requirements of Article III).
290. The judicially imposed prudential limitations require that 1) the injury be unique from
other people, 2) the plaintiff cannot claim the rights of third parties, and 3) the plaintiff must fall
within the zone of interests protected by the statute. Kyles I1, 222 F.3d at 294; see also supra Part
II.E.2 (covering the judicially imposed, prudential standing requirements).
291. Kyles I!, 222 F.3d at 294.
292. Id. (quoting Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979)).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
296. Kyles H!, 222 F.3d at 294. The Seventh Circuit did not bifurcate the standing question
into a consideration of Article III standing and then statutory standing as did the district court.
id.; Kvles I, No. 97 C 8311, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15428, *4, *8 (N.D. I11.Sept. 18, 1998).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 32

In answering the standing question, the Kyles H court concluded that
Congress intended to extend standing under Title VII to the Article III
limits, thereby giving private citizens the right to act as "private
attorneys general. 29 7 As with any plaintiff, the central question for the
court became whether employment testers could allege an "injury in
fact" as aggrieved persons. 298 To answer that question, the court turned
to Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, commonly known as the
Fair Housing Act. 299 Similar to Title VII, the FHA allows a suit to be
filed by any "aggrieved" person. 300 Relying on Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman,30 1 the Seventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court held that
housing testers3 °2 have standing to sue under the FHA.3 °3 Furthermore,
according to the Kyles II court, Congress intended standing under the
FHA to extend to the limits of Article III as well, 3° making the sole
requirement for standing "injury in fact. ' 30 5 The injury protected
against by the FHA is misrepresentations concerning the availability of
housing; 30 6 that statute creates both a legal right to be free of any

297. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at 295 (citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,
209 (1972)). The phrase "private attorneys general" refers to Congress' decision to authorize
civil actions by private individuals as well as the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Kyles 11, 222
F.3d at 295; Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 424-25. Thus, not only can the EEOC enforce Title VII,
but private citizens can also enforce their rights under the statute, thereby acting as "private
attorneys general." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at 295; Yelnosky, supra note
66, at 424-25.
298. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at 295.
299. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994). Because the FHA is considered the
"functional equivalent" of Title VII, Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at 295, EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d
439, 453 (6th Cir. 1977), the two acts are given like construction and application by the courts,
Kyles 1H,222 F.3d at 295, Metro. Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
1283, 1289 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
300. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i).
301. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982). Havens involved a defendant
who was found liable under the FHA for practicing racial steering by showing African-Americans
apartments only in certain areas and misinforming them as to the availability of housing in other
areas. Id. at 366 n. 1. Two testers were plaintiffs in the action, and the Court held that an AfricanAmerican tester had standing under the FHA. Id. at 368, 374.
302. See supra text accompanying note 125 (comparing the use of testers in the housing and
employment sectors).
303. Kyles 1I, 222 F.3d at 295-96.
304. Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9, 109 (1979); Kyles II, 222 F.3d at
296.
305. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (holding that plaintiffs seeking to challenge a
town's zoning practices for excluding low to moderate income residents from the town lacked
standing to sue because they could not allege an injury the court was capable of redressing); Kyles
11, 222 F.3d at 296.
306. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1994).
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misrepresentations
and the ability to enforce that right through a private
30 7
action.
civil
The Kyles I court noted that a housing tester has standing, regardless
of the tester's intent to rent an apartment or purchase a home, because
all individuals have a right to be free of misrepresentations about the
availability of housing. 30 8 Relying upon the landmark ruling in Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman,3°9 the Kyles H court then discussed how the
Seventh Circuit subsequently held that housing testers have standing to
sue for additional violations of the FHA.31 0 Thus, the Kyles II court
noted that in the Seventh Circuit, housing testers clearly have standing
to sue for a number of violations of the FHA. 3 1 1
Having concluded that housing testers have standing under the FHA,
the Kyles II court compared Title VII to the FHA.3 12 While Title VII
does not have a section comparable to § 3604(d) of the FHA,3 13 the
court noted that the two statutes are similar in three other important
respects.31 4 First, both statutes take a broad aim at discrimination.3 1 5
Second, the Seventh Circuit recognized that both statutes authorize
"private attorneys general, 3 16 thereby permitting any aggrieved person

307. Kyles 11,
222 F.3d at 296.
308. Id.
309. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982); supra note 301 and
accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's holding that housing testers have standing to
sue under the FHA).
310. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (b); Kyles II, 222 F.3d at 296-97 (discussing Village of Bellwood v.
Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990)). The FHA prohibits anyone from refusing to sell or rent
after making a bona fide offer or to negotiate for the sale or rental of housing on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Similarly, § 3604(b) prohibits
discrimination in the terms of sale or rental, or the services provided in connection with such sale
or rental on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. § 3604(b).
311. Kyles 1I, 222 F.3d at 297.
312. Id. at 297-98.
313. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d); Kyles II, 222 F.3d at 297.
314. Kyles H, 222 F.3d at 297-98.
315. Id. at 297 (citing EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 453 (6th Cir. 1977)). On its face,
Title VII provides that it is unlawful for any employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994). Furthermore, it
is illegal "to limit, segregate, or classify [any] employees or applicants for employment in any
way ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. § 2000e2(a)(2).
Similarly, the FHA takes a broad aim at discrimination by prohibiting any
misrepresentation on the availability of housing, or refusing to sell or rent on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. § 3604(a), (d).
316. Kyles 11,222 F.3d at 297 (citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,
209 (1972)); see also supra note 297 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' decision to
authorize private individuals as well as the EEOC to bring civil actions to enforce their rights
under Title VII).
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to file a civil suit. 3 17 Finally, the court noted that both statutes reveal
Congress' intent to extend standing to the limits of Article III because
3 18
of their breadth and scope.
Based upon these similarities, the Seventh Circuit proffered three
319
reasons why employment testers have standing to sue under Title VII.
First, the Supreme Court's decision in Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman,320 as well as the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that testers have
standing to sue for additional violations of the FHA,3 2 1 indicate that
employment testers have standing because Title VII created a broad
right to be free of discrimination. 322 The Kyles II court stated that Title
VII created a broad right, beyond a mere refusal to hire, because it
protects any individual, including a tester, from being limited,
classified, or segregated in any way on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. 323 Thus, if a tester is not considered for a job
because she is African-American, she has been improperly limited or
segregated, and, therefore, she has suffered a sufficient injury under
324
Title VII according to the Seventh Circuit.
Second, the court stated that the standing of employment testers is
consistent with the statutory purpose of Title VII because Title VII
reflects a strong public interest to eradicate discrimination from the
workplace. 325 According to the Kyles II court, individuals serve this

317. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at 297. Arguably, Title VII is even broader than the FHA because it
authorizes a suit by any person "claiming" to be aggrieved, while the FHA requires that a person
actually be given a misrepresentation about housing. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), 3604(d).
318. Kyles H1,222 F.3d at 297-98; see also supra note 299 and accompanying text (noting that
Title VII is treated similar to the FHA because it is the "functional equivalent" of the FHA).
319. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at 298-99.
320. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (holding that housing testers have
standing to sue under the FHA for being misinformed as to the availability of housing).
321. Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that housing
testers had standing to sue a real estate brokerage firm engaging in racial steering for additional
violations of the FHA; specifically the court noted that Congress was within its power to enact
laws creating substantive legal rights and to grant standing to individuals injured under the
statute).
322. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at 298.
323. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2) (1994); Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at
298.
324. Kyles H, 222 F.3d at 298. The court noted the contradictory language found in Sledge II,
585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978) (stating that "tester" plaintiffs are not harmed by a refusal to hire
because they are not actually interested in the job), and Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life
Insurance Society, 657 F. Supp. 1022 (M.D. Ga. 1987) (finding that a plaintiff without a genuine
interest in employment could not establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination), but
did not find them dispositive. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at 298.
325. Kyles II, 222 F.3d at 298-99; see supra Part H.A (discussing the legislative history of
Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
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purpose by acting as private attorneys general in enforcing Title VII
through private civil actions. 326 Testers, likewise, advance this interest
because it is difficult to prove discrimination, and testers provide
evidence about discrimination that is frequently valuable, if not
indispensable. 327 Finally, the court noted that the EEOC supports the
328
standing of employment testers and has formally issued that opinion.
While the EEOC's position is not binding upon the court, it is helpful
because the EEOC is the administrative agency charged with enforcing
329
Title VII on a daily basis.
Before concluding, however, the court made two brief comments
about the district court's opinion.330 First, the Seventh Circuit rebutted
the district judge's analysis on the role of a bona fide applicant in a Title
VII claim, stating that such a consideration applies only to the merits of
the case, not to whether the plaintiff has standing. 33 1 Second, and more
importantly, the court said that a bona fide interest in the job is not
necessary to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. 3 32 As a
result, the Seventh Circuit held that the tester plaintiffs had standing to
sue under Title VII. 333 Ultimately, that decision serves as a landmark
326. Kyles I1, 222 F.3d at 299 (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402
(1968)).
327. Id. (quoting Richardson v. Howard, 712 F.2d 319, 321 (7th Cir. 1983)); see also supra
note 131 and accompanying text (discussing the Seventh Circuit's endorsement of testers in
Richardson, 712 F.2d at 321-22).
328. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at 299 (discussing EEOCEnforcement Guidance);see also supra note
124.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 299-300.
331. Id. (citing Allen v. Prince George's County, Md., 538 F. Supp. 833, 841-43 (D. Md.
1982), and Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 657 F. Supp. 1022, 1032-33 (M.D. Ga.
1987)). In fact, the Supreme Court noted that "standing in no way depends on the merits of the
plaintiff's contention that particular conduct is illegal." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500
(1975) (denying standing to nonresident plaintiffs challenging the zoning practices of the
defendant municipality as exclusionary).
332. Kyles II, 222 F.3d at 300. The plaintiff's intent matters only for the type of remedy
available because Title VII prohibits an individual from being discriminated against "in any
way." Id. Contra Sledge 11, 585 F.2d 625, 641 (4th Cir. 1978) (reversing the district court's
dismissal on the merits of an apparent tester's claim because the tester was not given an
opportunity to prove whether he was a bona fide applicant); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life
Ins. Soc'y, 657 F. Supp. 1022, 1032-33 (M.D. Ga. 1987) (holding that the plaintiff failed to make
out a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII because he was not genuinely interested
in the job).
333. Kyles II, 222 F.3d at 300. Consequently, the Kyles 11 court reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant and remanded the case back to the lower
court. Id. at 305. As for the plaintiffs' § 1981 standing, the court affirmed the district court's
denial of standing. Id. at 304-05. Essentially, the court denied the plaintiffs standing under
§ 1981, which forbids racial discrimination in the making of public and private contracts, because
the court concluded that Congress did not intend to extend standing to the limits of Article III
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response to the knock of employment testers seeking to sue under Title
334
VII and opened wide the courtroom door.
IV.

ANALYSIS

Examining the rationale behind each of the cases concerning the issue
of tester standing or the injury suffered by a tester 335 reveals a clear split
among a few federal jurisdictions. 336 Prior to the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Kyles H, 337 no federal circuit court had held that
employment testers have standing under Title VII.338 With the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Kyles II, however, the standing of employment
testers under Title VII is clearly and properly recognized. 339 The
precedent established within the Seventh Circuit should be followed in
every jurisdiction, 340 despite groundless criticism from opponents of
employment testing. 34 1 Accordingly, courts should cast aside the
misplaced treatment testers received in the District of Columbia and
342
Fourth Circuits.
with § 1981. Id. at 303. Thus, § 1981 only protects parties genuinely interested in a contractual
relationship. Id. The court noted a potential split among the circuits as to its holding, as the
Third and Eleventh Circuits have seemingly found that testers do have standing under § 1981. Id.
at 301-02. However, the Seventh Circuit sides with the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in
BMC 11, 28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994), to deny standing. Id. at 302. For a discussion of the
standing of employment testers under § 1981 discrimination cases, see Landever, supra note 187,
at 385-92. See also supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing the interplay between
Title VII and § 1981 claims).
334. See Kyles II, 222 F.3d at 300.
335. See supra Parts II.F.1-3 (canvassing the lower federal courts' responses to employment
testers), III.A-C (discussing the treatment of employment testers in the Fourth, District of
Columbia and Seventh Circuits).
336. Compare Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at 300 (holding that employment testers have standing under
Title VII), with BMC II, 28 F.3d at 1272-74 (holding that testers did not have standing to recover
damages because the alleged discriminatory conduct took place at a time when Title VII did not
permit recovery of damages, and that testers lacked standing for equitable relief), and Sledge 11,
585 F.2d at 641 (indicating that "test" plaintiffs are not harmed by discriminatory conduct
because they lack genuine interest in the position).
337. Kyles M, 222 F.3d at 300.
338. BMC H, 28 F.3d at 1272, 1274; see also Sledge 1I, 585 F.2d at 641.
339. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at 300; infra Part IV.A (arguing that the Seventh Circuit's granting of
legal standing to employment testers was correct because the Court properly analyzed testers'
standing under Title VII and properly recognized EEOC support for testing, and because the
lingering effects of discrimination necessitate this decision).
340. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at 300 (holding that employment testers have standing to sue under
Title VII).
341. Infra Part IV.B (arguing that the efficacy of testing overcomes any possible ethical or
financial concerns).
342. BMC II, 28 F.3d at 1272-74 (holding that testers lack standing to sue under Title VII for
monetary or equitable relief); Sledge H, 585 F.2d at 641 (stating that test plaintiffs do not suffer
an injury because they are not genuinely interested in employment); infra Part IV.C (arguing that
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A. The CourtroomDoor Was Properly Opened: An Analysis of the
Kyles II Decision
The Seventh Circuit is correct in holding that testers suffer a
sufficient injury to have legal standing to sue under Title VII for three
reasons. 34 3 First, the Seventh Circuit's legal analysis of the doctrine of
standing, 344 as it applies to Title VII claims brought by employment
testers, is sound.3 45 Second, the EEOC, the administrative agency
charged with enforcing Title VII on a daily basis, also supports the
standing of testers. 346 Finally, the lingering presence of discrimination
in the United States demands that every effective method for combating
discrimination be employed, especially seeking redress in federal
347

courts.

The Kyles II court's legal analysis is well reasoned and supported by
several strong arguments in favor of the standing of testers in
employment discrimination litigation. 348 The ambiguity or obscurity of
the doctrine of standing has been noted by legal commentators as well
as by the Supreme Court, 349 but a plaintiff cannot enter the courtroom,
or at least remain for very long, if the court does not find some
justification for standing in the particular case. 350 The "case and
controversy" requirement of Article III of the United States
Constitution 35 1 provides some guideline for determining whether a
plaintiff can properly seek redress in the federal courts, 352 but the
353
federal judiciary has also imposed its own prudential requirements.
the District of Columbia Circuit improperly denied testers equitable relief).
343. Kyles II, 222 F.3d at 300.
344. See supra Part II.E (discussing the constitutional and prudential standing requirements);
see also supra note 15 and accompanying text (defining standing as the right to bring a legal
claim before a court).
345. Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 426-27.
346. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 124.
347. See Ayres, supra note 2, at 818; Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Remedying Employment
DiscriminationAgainst African-American Males: Stereotypical Biases Engender a Case of Race
Plus Sex Discrimination, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 23, 24 (1996) [hereinafter Weatherspoon,
Remedying].
348. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at 295-300; see Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 427 (arguing against
requiring that an applicant for employment have a bona fide interest in the job in order to confer
legal standing to sue).
349. Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 417-18 (discussing the vagueness of standing law and noting
several Supreme Court cases in which the Court acknowledged the same).
350. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 1240.
351. U.S. CONST. art. IIl, § 2, cl. 1.
352. Supra Part ILE. I (explaining the constitutional standing requirements in federal courts).
353. Supra Part II.E.2 (discussing the prudential standing limitations imposed by federal
courts).
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According to the Seventh Circuit in Kyles H, however, Congress has the
power to create rights and give individuals the power to enforce those
rights.354 The court correctly noted that Congress has the ability to
create standing through a statute, where plaintiffs would otherwise not
355
have standing.
In the context of employment discrimination claims, the Seventh
Circuit properly recognized that Congress created "private attorneys
general ' 356 through Title VII by giving any person claiming to be
aggrieved the right to enforce Title VII through a civil action. 357 As a
result, the real issue with tester standing under Title VII depends upon
the interpretation of the statute. 35 8 In interpreting Title VII, the Kyles H
court turned to the FHA and correctly noted that Title VII and the FHA
are nearly identical in their reach and functionality because they are
both broad civil rights laws. 359 Both the FHA and Title VII prohibit
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, and their enforcement provisions are nearly the same as well. 3 6
The core of Title VII enforcement is preventing discrimination in the
workplace, whether a result of disparate treatment or disparate
impact. 36 1 As the Seventh Circuit rightfully noted, the use of testers
clearly comports with the intent of Title VII to eradicate discrimination
362
because testers are valuable enforcement tools.
By looking to the actual language of Title VII, it is evident that
Congress did not intend to require a bona fide interest in the job in order
to have standing. 363 It is illegal for any employer to fail or refuse to hire
354. Kyles H, 222 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 2000).
355. Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 417-19.
356. Kyles H, 222 F.3d at 295; see also supra note 297 and accompanying text (discussing the
origin and definition of the term "private attorneys general").
357. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994). The Kyles H court noted
that Title VII:
expressly permits a charge to be filed with the [EEOC] "by or on behalf of a person
claiming to be aggrieved," § 2000e-5(b), and likewise a civil action in court "by the
person claiming to be aggrieved," § 2000e-5(f)(1). That language signals a
congressional intent to extend standing to the outermost limits of Article HI.
Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at 295.
358. Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 424.
359. Kyles I, 222 F.3d at 295 (citing EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 453 (6th Cir. 1977));
Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 424.
360. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2), 3604(a)-(d) (1994); Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 424.
361. Anderson, supra note 10, at 1263; see supra Part II.C (discussing recovery in disparate
treatment and disparate impact cases).
362. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at 299; Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 425; Anderson, supra note 10, at
1263; see supra text accompanying notes 131-40 (discussing the benefits of employment testing).
363. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2); Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 427.
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any individual, or to limit, segregate, or classify any job applicant in any
364
way on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Accordingly, it is apparent that, as the Kyles II court found, anything
less than nondiscriminatory treatment of any person applying for any
job amounts to a violation of Title VII. 365 Title VII does not speak to
the required intent of the individual discriminated against. 366 In the case
of housing testers, the Kyles II court noted that the tester's intent does
not negate his injury when he is lied to about the availability of
housing. 367 Furthermore, both Title VII and the courts do not even
require a plaintiff to prove that he would accept a position to make out a
368
prima facie case of discrimination.
When the treatment of housing testers and the broad purpose of Title
VII is combined with the federal courts' tradition of liberally applying
the standing requirements in civil rights litigation, 369 testers clearly must
have standing to sue under Title VII regardless of whether they have a
bona fide interest in the job. 370 The Seventh Circuit properly relied on
the Supreme Court's approval of the standing of housing testers in
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman.371 Accordingly, the Kyles II decision
properly illustrates that granting standing to employment testers is a
logical extension of standing for housing testers under the FHA and is
372
based on sound judicial reasoning.
364. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2).
365. Kyles I1, 222 F.3d at 298.
366. Id. at 296.
367. Id.
368. Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 427; see supra text accompanying notes 96-100 (discussing
the framework laid out in McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green for proving a prima facie case of
discrimination). Perhaps the real ambit of the tester's injury is that the tester had an interest in
not being discriminated against by the defendant, rather than an actual interest in securing a job.
The right not to be the subject of discrimination in any way within the employment context is
statutorily protected by Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)--(2). The injury suffered by a tester
is that the tester was discriminated against, not that they could not get the job. Id. § 2000e2(a)(1)-(2); see Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 427. The only issue really affected by the applicant's
interest in the position is the type of remedy available, which requires a finding of discrimination
on the merits and, thus, standing. Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 427. See generally Lea v. Cone
Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1971) (affirming the district court's refusal to award back
pay to tester plaintiffs, but awarding attorneys' fees).
369. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 124; Brown, supra note 14, at 1130; Jonathan
Levy, Comment, In Response to Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC
Marketing Corp.: Employment Testers Do Have a Leg to Stand On, 80 MINN. L. REV. 123, 143
n.99 (1995) (discussing the traditionally liberal application of the standing doctrine in civil rights
cases by federal courts).
370. Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 427.
371. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378 (1982); see also Brown, supra note
14, at 1130.
372. Kyles II, 222 F.3d 289, 300 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Brown, supra note 14, at 1130.
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In addition to the legal foundation upon which the Kyles H court laid
its decision, the court noted the administrative support from the EEOC
for the standing of employment testers. 37 3 The court's recognition of
the EEOC's position properly acknowledged an important source of
support for the standing of testers. 37 4 In November 1990, the EEOC
issued its first Policy Guidance on the standing of testers for claims of
employment discrimination brought under Title VII. 375 That opinion
was later superseded by an EEOC Enforcement Guidance supporting
376
the same conclusion.
Because Title VII authorizes charges by or on behalf of a person
claiming to be aggrieved,37 7 the question is whether a tester constitutes
an aggrieved person. 378 The EEOC recognized the role that housing
testers play in ferreting out discrimination and stated its belief that there
is no difference between testers used in fair housing cases and
employment testers. 37 9 Similar to the Seventh Circuit's rationale, the
EEOC relied upon a broad interpretation of standing under Title VII and
the historical context of civil rights litigation, especially in fair housing
litigation, to issue its approval of the use and standing of testers. 3 80 In
issuing that approval, the EEOC also agreed to accept charges of
381
employment discrimination from testers.
Furthermore, the EEOC is not alone in its support for the use of
testers. 382 In January 1996, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs ("OFCCP"), which enforces an executive order prohibiting
discrimination by federal government contractors, began a testing
program of its own. 383 Ultimately, the EEOC's support for the standing

373. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at 299.
374. Id. at 299; EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 124. The Supreme Court even
noted that, "'while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, [EEOC
guidelines] do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance."' Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65
(1986) (noting EEOC support for the position that sexual harassment leading to non-economic
injury is a legally cognizable claim under Title VII).
375. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 124.
376. Id.
377. Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994).
378. Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 424.
379. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 124.
380. Id.
381. Id.; Eric Matusewitch, Commentary, Companies May be Sued for Discrimination by
Employment Testers, ANDREWs EMP. LITIG. REP., Apr. 22, 1997, at 22, 165.
382. Matusewitch, supra note 381, at 22, 165.
383. Id.
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of testers is a persuasive argument because384that agency is charged with
enforcing Title VII's rights on a daily basis.
Finally, the lingering social atmosphere of discrimination in the
United States further supports the legal theory behind granting
employment testers standing in federal court. 385 A study by the Urban
Institute in the early 1990s concluded that unequal treatment of AfricanAmerican job applicants is entrenched and widespread.38 6
More
specifically, African-American applicants allegedly experienced
discriminatory treatment and practices almost three times as often as
white applicants. 387 In addition, a study by Professor Ian Ayres'
documenting the disparities experienced during new car sales
negotiations between black and white, male and female buyers further
reveals the continued presence of discrimination. 388
Likewise,
Professor Floyd Weatherspoon revealed that the impact of
discrimination against African-American males in society is too costly,
as he traced the development and perpetuation of racial stereotypes as
the motivating force for such discrimination. 389
Professor
Weatherspoon also examined the high unemployment rates of AfricanAmerican males. 390 Their rate of unemployment has only increased
over the past few decades without showing any signs of improving in
the future. 39' That trend is only one of the many devastating effects of
392
employment discrimination upon that segment of the population.
Ultimately, however, the rationale for granting standing to employment
testers is clearly grounded in sound legal and social analysis of the
purpose of Title VII as well as the importance of continuing to utilize all
393
available resources to combat employment discrimination.
B. Lingering Questions, Especiallyfrom Employers
Though the Seventh Circuit's endorsement of testing is legally and
socially sound, many critics, especially employers, argue that testing is

384. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 124.
385. Ayres, supra note 2, at 818; Weatherspoon, Remedying, supra note 347, at 24; Wymer &
Sudbury, supra note 139, at 623.
386. Wymer & Sudbury, supra note 139, at 623.
387. Id.
388. Ayres, supra note 2, at 818.
389. Weatherspoon, Remedying, supra note 347, at 28-41.
390. Weatherspoon, Devastating Impact, supra note 2, at 52.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d 289, 300 (7th Cir. 2000); see also EEOC Enforcement Guidance,
supra note 124; Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 427.
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ethically unfair.3 94 That argument, however, is misplaced.39 5 When the
EEOC first endorsed the use of testers in 1990, employer groups rallied
to voice their opposition to the idea. 396 Employers' concerns focused on
the deceptive nature of testing, the potential detrimental impacts of
testing on employers, the possible undermining of the EEOC's
effectiveness and authority, and the increased costs associated with
397
addressing testing in the hiring process.
In his support for the use of testing to ferret out discrimination in
low-skill, entry-level positions, Professor Michael Yelnosky also
recognized the potential increased costs employers will face as a result
of testing. 398 Yelnosky, however, further posited that such testing will
not dramatically increase the costs for employers because hiring for
such jobs is usually a summary process. 399 Employers' costs for
evaluating applicants for low-skill, entry-level positions are minimal,
and spending time evaluating a tester will not be detrimental
because
4°
the applicant pool for these positions is generally so large. W
Despite any debate over what levels to test, many employers believe
4 1
that testing programs will significantly increase their costs. 0
Employers are not happy with the deceptive nature of testing, even
going so far as to call testing entrapment because testers pose as
applicants with false credentials. 402 More appropriately, however, some
employers have chosen to address the issue in a positive light by
conducting internal testing programs to detect discrimination in the
hiring process. 403 Ultimately, the costs associated with sensitizing

394. Brown, supra note 14, at 1140-41.
395. Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 414; see also Brown, supra note 14, at 1140-41.
396. Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 414; see also Brown, supra note 14, at 1140-41.
397. Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 414; see also Brown, supra note 14, at 1140-41.
398. Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 414.
399. Id.
400. Id. Yelnosky believes, however, that testing for high-skill positions is not desired for
several reasons. Id. First, the costs to the employer associated with hiring for upper level
positions is generally greater, the applicant pool is usually smaller, thereby wasting the
employers' time, and discrimination victims in these situations are more likely to sue. Id. at 41415. Responding to Professor Yelnosky, Professor Leroy Clark advocates for testing at all levels,
including in upper-level positions. Clark, supra note 137, at 21.
401. Wymer & Sudbury, supra note 139, at 623.
402. Id.
403. Id. Employers can further avoid potential claims by conducting training and developing
guidelines for interviewers on discriminatory practices. Id. Among other things, experts
recommend that interviewers make notes following interviews, that employers standardize
interviewing questions or processes by developing point systems, that applicants be required to
sign a statement confirming their genuine interest in the position, or that interviewers document
any "disinterest" exhibited by applicants. Id.
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employers and their agents to discriminatory employment practices
should not be seen as an effective argument for prohibiting testing, let
alone the standing of testers. 40 4 Perhaps the cost associated with such
efforts is precisely what is required to eliminate discrimination. 4 5 For
businesses that do not employ discriminatory practices, it is logical that
there should be little additional cost or risk associated with the prospect
of testing because interviewers should be sensitized. On the other hand,
those employers who are vociferous in their opposition to testing are
those whose behavior needs to be changed. Title VII was passed to
prevent discrimination, 40 6 and society will inevitably have a price to pay
to accomplish that goal. 4' 7 Let those who discriminate bear the cost.
C. The BMC II Analysis on Equitable Relief is Erroneous
The Seventh Circuit did not distinguish between the testers' standing
to seek damages and equitable relief under Title VII, 40 8 but the District
of Columbia Circuit improperly made that distinction.' °
While the
District of Columbia Circuit denied standing to the testers seeking
damages in BMC II because Title VII did not permit recovery of
damages at the time of the alleged discrimination, the court also denied
the testers standing to seek equitable relief.4 10 However, the District of
Columbia Circuit's rationale for denying standing for equitable relief is
erroneous.41 1 By relying upon City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 4 12 the BMC
II court failed to recognize important distinctions between the tester4 13
plaintiffs in BMC II and the chokehold victim in Lyons.
First, the Supreme Court repeatedly noted in Lyons that the plaintiff
in that case was still left with a damages remedy, while the testers in
BMC II were left with no remedy. 4 14 Second, denying testers standing
for equitable relief will leave less incentive for employers to comply

404. See id.
405. See Brown, supra note 14, at 1142 (discussing the indispensable role of testers in
discrimination cases).
406. See supra Part II.A (describing the legislative history of Title VII and the Civil Rights
Act of 1991).
407. See Kyles II, 222 F.3d 289, 299 (7th Cir. 2000).
408. Id. at 300.
409. BMC II, 28 F.3d 1268, 1272-74 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
410. Id. at 1274.
411. Levy, supra note 369, at 159.
412. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); see supra note 208 and accompanying
text (describing the facts and holding in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983)).
413. Levy, supra note 369, at 160.
414. BMC II, 28 F.3d at 1272, 1274; Levy, supra note 369, at 160.
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with Title VII. 4 15 Because bona fide applicants are not likely to
discover or become aware of the discrimination, employers utilizing
discriminatory practices are more likely to do so successfully. 4 16 Even
if bona fide applicants become aware of the discrimination, the BMC H
standard requires such precise allegations that the bona fide applicant4is17
threatened with future harm in order to overcome the Lyons obstacle.
The absence of important federalism concerns in employment tester
cases eliminates the need for such strict standards because the courts are
4 18
not being asked to supervise a local or state governmental agency.
Thus, adherence to the Lyons standard amounts to "arch-formalism" and
is completely inconsistent with the broad standing
given by Title VII
4 19
and accorded by the courts in civil rights cases.
Finally, studies have clearly shown how prejudice still plays 420a
significant role with respect to hiring minority job applicants.
Decisions that severely limit, or in the case of BMC H eliminate, even
equitable remedies when discrimination is detected by civil rights
advocates make it seem as though the justice system sanctions such
conduct. 42 1 Ultimately, however, the decision to deny the testers
standing for equitable relief reflects the continued narrowing of Title
VII by the courts and an unjust manipulation of standing doctrine 422
to
suits.
of
kinds
certain
of
dockets
court
federal
clear
effectively
Fortunately,
the Kyles H court injected a bit of justice into the
3
process.

42

V. PROPOSAL

Despite misplaced objections from employers over the legitimacy of
employment testing in Title VII cases, 424 and precisely because of the

415. Levy, supra note 369, at 160.
416. Id. Bona fide job applicants are less likely to discover discriminatory employment
practices because they are generally not looking for the subtle ways in which it appears. Id. at
125 n.14.
417. BMC II, 28 F.3d at 1274; Levy, supra note 369, at 160-61.
418. Levy, supra note 369, at 160.
419. See id. at 161.
420. Weatherspoon, Devastating Impact, supra note 2, at 53-54; Weatherspoon, Remedying,
supra note 347, at 28-41; see also Wymer & Sudbury, supra note 139, at 628 (discussing the
1990 study by the Urban Institute, which found that African-Americans experience discrimination
three times as often as whites).
421. Weatherspoon, DevastatingImpact, supra note 2, at 53-54.
422. Levy, supra note 369, at 163.
423. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d 289, 300 (7th Cir. 2000).
424. See supra notes 385-90 and accompanying text (discussing various studies on
discrimination and its effects on segments of the United States population).
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demonstrated need to continue to combat discrimination, 425 the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Kyles II should stand as an example for the future
of employment discrimination litigation. 426 In addition, proposals to
authorize the EEOC to conduct testing programs would effectively
further the enforcement of Title VII as well as clearly comport with the
427
spirit of the Seventh Circuit's decision.
A. Keep the Door Open: Testers Should Have Standing in All
Jurisdictions
While the early 1990s saw rapid growth in employment
discrimination litigation as one of the most contentious areas of civil
rights law, 428 the use of testing as an acceptable means of combating
discrimination will likely cause another hot debate early in the new
century. 429 The Seventh Circuit's approval of tester standing represents
the first clear and convincing affirmation of the use of employment
testing by a federal circuit court. 4 3 0 However, because of the treatment
testers received in other circuits, a debate among the jurisdictions on
43 1
this precise issue is afoot.
The social climate of the United States clearly supports the standing
of testers in claims brought under Title VII. 432 One need look only as
far as the high unemployment rates faced by African-American

425. See supra text accompanying notes 374-80 (examining the EEOC's endorsement of the
use of employment testers).
426. Kyles I1, 222 F.3d at 300.
427. Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 459.
428. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (describing the increased rate of employment
discrimination suits in the early 1990s).
429. See Rochelle L. Stanfield, Measuring Job Bias, 23 NAT'L J. 2598 (Oct. 26, 1991)
(discussing the increased use of employment testing in the early 1990s during a time when
employment discrimination litigation dramatically increased).
430. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at 300.
431. See BMC 11, 28 F.3d 1268, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (denying testers standing under Title
VII); see also Sledge 11, 585 F.2d 625, 641 (4th Cir. 1978) (stating that "test" plaintiffs suffer no
real injury because they are not seriously interested in the job for which they apply); Lea v. Cone
Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971) (Boreman, J., dissenting) (describing litigation initiated
by an apparent "test" plaintiff as "manufactured litigation"); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life
Ins. Soc'y, 657 F. Supp. 1022, 1032 (M.D. Ga. 1987) (holding the "test" plaintiff failed to make
out a prima facie case of discrimination on the merits because it appeared he was not genuinely
interested in the job).
432. Weatherspoon, Devastating Impact, supra note 2, at 26, 52 (discussing the impact of race
discrimination, particularly on African-Americans); Weatherspoon, Remedying, supra note 347,
at 33-41 (examining stereotypes of African-American males and their impact on employment
decisions); Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 410 (noting the impact of high African-American
unemployment and discussing the use of testers as an effective means of enforcing Title VII for
low-skill, entry-level jobs).
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males, 4 33 or to the disparities in negotiations over new car purchases
experienced between whites and African-Americans, and males and
females, to know that discrimination is thriving in America. 434 Even if
one ignored the social value of employment testing, it is inescapable
that the law is on the side of testers. 4 35 While courts may seemingly
ignore the law and deny remedies to legitimate plaintiffs,4 36 thereby
narrowing the scope of Title
VII, 437 the road to the future is paved with
438
sound judicial reasoning.
Congress clearly intended to extend standing under Title VII to the
limits of Article III, similar to standing under the FHA for housing
testers 439 and gave private citizens the right to enforce their rights under
Title VII.44° There has even been clear administrative support from the
EEOC through its Policy and Enforcement Guidances for the standing
of employment testers. 4 1 In addition, support for the standing of
employment testers was voiced for several years prior to the decision in
Kyles 11442 by numerous legal commentators. 443 Finally, many civil
rights activists recognize that testing is the most effective way to gather
evidence and research on discriminatory practices. 444 Testing is more
accurate than statistical analysis because direct experiences with
employers provide more concrete results, and there is more credibility
445
and legitimacy associated with clear evidence of disparate treatment.
As a result, other jurisdictions should follow the example set by the
Seventh Circuit and find that employment testers have standing to sue

433. Weatherspoon, Devastating Impact, supra note 2, at 28.
434. Ayres, supra note 2, at 819.
435. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994); Kyles II, 222 F.3d at 300;
Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 427.
436. BMC I, 28 F.3d at 1274 (holding that testers lacked standing to seek equitable and legal
relief under Title VII).
437. Levy, supra note 369, at 162-63.
438. Kyles II, 222 F.3d at 300.
439. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(d) (1994).
440. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 428.
441. EEOC Enforcement Guidance,supra note 124.
442. Kyles 11, 222 F.3d at 300.
443. 2 SPRIGGS, supra note 4, § 22.12[3], at 22-67 to 22-68; Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 42627; Anderson, supra note 10, at 1251; Brown, supra note 14, at 1130-31; Levy, supra note 369, at
159.
444. Stanfield, supra note 429, at 2599 (quoting Michael Fix, an attorney for the Urban
Institute who designed the method for employment testers); see supra notes 130-39 and
accompanying text (describing the numerous benefits of employment testing in Title VII
enforcement).
445. Stanfield, supra note 429, at 2598.
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for legal and equitable relief under Title VII, thereby keeping the
446
courtroom doors wide open.
B. FurtherImprovements-Authorizing the EEOC to Conduct Testing
Another way to increase the resources to combat employment
discrimination is to authorize testing programs conducted by the federal
government through the EEOC. 447 First, however, in order for the
EEOC to implement testing programs, Title VII must be amended. 4 8
Title VII gives the EEOC the power to prevent any employer from
utilizing discriminatory practices as set forth in § 2000e-2 or
§ 2000e-3. 449 Upon the filing of a charge, the EEOC conducts an
450
investigation.
When Title VII was amended in 1972, 45' however, Congress
curtailed the investigative powers of the EEOC in a political move to
protect employers' rights. 452 Accordingly, the EEOC's investigative
power
was limited to whatever was specifically spelled out in Title
VI1. 453 Because the EEOC was not given the power to conduct
undercover investigations, it cannot currently conduct its own testing
programs. 454 Furthermore, if given the authority to use testers, the
EEOC could not do so until after a charge is filed because Title VII
authorizes an EEOC investigation only after a charge has been filed.4 55
Amending Title VII and authorizing the EEOC to conduct testing
would also be beneficial for several procedural reasons. The EEOC is
more likely to receive injunctive relief because it cannot recover

446. Kyles H, 222 F.3d at 300.
447. Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 459.
448. Id.
449. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994); Yelnosky, supra note 66, at
459.
450. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-8, 2000e-9; Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 459-60.
451. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, sec. 2, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
452. Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 461.
453. Id. at 461-62.
454. Id. at 462.
455. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 463. This process is modified
slightly by the EEOC's power to file charges itself, but it is unable to conduct an investigation
related to any charge it files on its own initiative. Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 466. That situation
is designed to give complainants the ability to file an anonymous charge, and utilizes the
complainant as the source of information. Id. The EEOC is also authorized to file "pattern or
practice" charges, which seek to make a "'positive impact on the employment opportunities
available to minorities and women."' Id. at 466-67. Such charges focus on deep, systemic
change, which testing could stimulate. Id. However, if private organizations are unable to
conduct testing programs, the EEOC will have no pattern or practice cases to file. Id. Allowing
the EEOC to conduct testing could remedy that problem. Id.
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attorneys' fees. 456 Moreover, private individuals face many obstacles to
conducting testing programs, and the EEOC can obtain class-wide relief
without being certified as a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
3.
While the EEOC could bring tester claims under its "pattern and
practice" authority on behalf of aggrieved persons, it lacks the ability to
do so if private individuals or groups do not organize testing projects.4 58
Accordingly, amendment of Title VII would not only allow the EEOC
to conduct its own testing programs, but it would also signify
Congressional approval of the Seventh Circuit's holding 459 that testers
46 °
have standing to sue under Title VII.
VI. CONCLUSION

The continued presence of discrimination in the United States
reinforces the need for vigorous enforcement of Title VII. One can
debate whether the legal theory of tester standing under Title VII
supports the Seventh Circuit's holding in Kyles I, or whether the social
realities of discrimination in the United States necessitate that the
federal government utilize every available resource to combat that
discrimination. In the end, however, the conclusion should be the same.
Enforcement of Title VII's prohibitions on employment discrimination
by relying on testing programs is a step forward. With the Seventh
Circuit's recognition that employment testers can at least maintain a
foothold inside the courtroom door, there is hope that other jurisdictions
will also recognize the right of testers to be free from discriminatory
employment practices as well as the important role they play in
safeguarding federal employment laws.

456.
457.
458.
459.
460.

Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 469 n.303.
Id. at 469, 470.
Id. at 470.
Kyles H, 222 F.3d 289, 300 (7th Cir. 2000).
Yelnosky, supra note 66, at 470.

